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 CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Judge Gideon J. Tucker of New York once said “No man’s life, liberty, or property are 
safe while the Legislature is in session.”1  Amusing quotes notwithstanding, a vast majority of 
the country’s population has agreed that collective investment is sometimes required, and that the 
government must raise revenue to make these investments.  This revenue is derived from taxing 
the population of the jurisdiction wishing to invest.  Some level of taxation is a certainty in most 
jurisdictions, but analyses of the best mix of taxes for a jurisdiction are rarely available.  This 
paper aspires to so analyze the tax structure of the state of Tennessee.  This paper does not 
attempt to analyze the level or content of the expenditures of the state. 
 The paper begins by examining the evolution of taxation at the state level and defining 
the criteria on which state taxes are to be judged.  The paper proceeds to review methods analysts 
have previously employed to evaluate state tax structures.  A history of the development of 
Tennessee’s tax structure is then provided, leading into a model for analyzing and evaluating that 
structure.  Finally, an analysis using that model provides the basis for recommended changes to 
the Tennessee tax system 
 
A History of State Taxation 
 
 States were the first United States government entities to take an active role in the 
development of infrastructure through the use of taxes.  In a 2000 article, John Joseph Wallis 
reports the following on early changes in the financial systems of the United States: 
 1
 The first financial system lasted from 1790 until about 1842.  In 
this period state governments took the active lead in promoting 
economic development through infrastructure investment and legal 
innovation to promote corporations and banks.  Infrastructure 
investment and land sales offered governments the opportunity to 
collect “asset income.”  State governments were uniquely situated 
to charter corporations and create asset income in the process.  
Given the national government’s unwillingness to participate in 
transportation improvements, states took the lead in those 
investments as well.  By the 1830s, state debt was roughly eight 
times the debts of the national and local governments combined.2 
 
 From the mid-1840s to the eve of the Great Depression, local governments took the lead 
with property taxation as the primary source of revenue behind investment in education, 
highways, railroads, water systems, sewer systems and public utilities.  The federal government 
used an income tax and various excise taxes to fund the Civil War, and the Supreme Court 
initially upheld these.  A post-war income tax levy was overturned by the Supreme Court, 
however, leading to the ratification of the sixteenth amendment, specifically allowing federal 
income taxes, in 1913.3  The Great Depression and New Deal marked the beginning of the 
federal government’s lead role in raising revenue, though much of that revenue went to state and 
local governments as grants for infrastructure investment.  Income and sales taxes became the 
dominant source of revenue at both the national and state levels, and they remain so today.4 
 State and local revenues were, prior to the twentieth century, made up almost exclusively 
of property taxes, various business taxes and excise (selective consumption) taxes.  In addition, 
states funded infrastructure improvements by taking on long-term debt through bond sales that 
were generally tied to specific projects.  The move toward more progressive and diverse tax 
systems began in Wisconsin in 1911 with the passage of the first modern state income tax.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1Platt, 1992 
2Wallis, 2000, p. 62 
3Fox, 1986, pp. 1-2 
4Wallis, 2000, p. 62 
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 Proponents of the Wisconsin tax were less enthused about taxing income than they were about 
reducing (or halting the growth) of property and excise taxes.  State income taxation failed to 
“spread like wildfire,” as the Wisconsin Tax Commission had predicted, but other states slowly 
began to follow suit.  Between 1911 and 1929, ten more states added the income tax to their 
revenue portfolios.5 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) listed three reasons 
for the relatively slow progress on the income tax front prior to the Great Depression: 
First, most states were able to meet their expenditure requirements 
by increasing reliance on consumer taxes (selected excises) and by 
financing capital projects with long-term debt issues… 
Second, it was difficult to muster sufficient political support for a 
progressive income tax in a state that was confronted with neither a 
fiscal crisis nor a strong demand for property tax relief… 
Third, constitutional restrictions on the power of state legislatures 
to impose taxes also retarded the state income tax movement…6 
 
 The Great Depression created both state fiscal crises and demand for property tax relief.  
Between 1929 and 1938, eighteen states instituted broad-based personal income taxes, and the 
number of states with a general retail sales tax rose from zero to twenty-four.  The general retail 
sales tax was first imposed in Mississippi, when that state converted its low-rate business tax into 
a two-percent sales tax in 1932.7  By 1938, seventeen states had diversified their revenue 
portfolios to the point of including both of these taxes.8  The growth of the federal income tax, 
spurred mostly by the need to finance World War II and the Korean War, slowed the progress of 
state tax diversification over the next few decades.  Only one state, Alaska, added a state income 
tax between the years 1939 and 1960.  During this same time period, however, ten more states 
instituted state sales taxes. 
                                                          
5Shannon, 1987, p. 11 
6ACIR, 1965, p.54 
7Due & Mikesell, 1994, p. 1 
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  The baby boom fueled the next wave of state tax diversification.  The pressure that the 
explosive population growth put on public school systems again created fiscal crises and 
demands for property tax relief.  “Between 1960 and 1971, nine states adopted personal income 
taxes and eleven states joined the general sales tax ranks – the number of states with both levies 
rose to thirty-six.”9  The 1960s also saw large growth in state corporate income taxes.  These 
were often instituted at the same time as state personal income taxes. 
In 1967, the ACIR offered its support to the diversification born of fiscal pressures: 
While the champions of the graduated personal income tax and the 
sales tax advocates still engage in political sniping, this contest has 
lost much of the bitterness that in former times had transformed the 
state tax arena into a dark and bloody political battleground.  The 
importance of the change cannot be overemphasized because bitter 
clashes between sales and income tax advocates for years 
hamstrung efforts to create a more diversified and productive state 
tax system. 
The perennial sales versus income tax debate is now a luxury few 
states can afford… 
A broad-based sales-personal income tax combination enables a 
state to create a diversified and productive revenue system while 
holding tax rates to moderate levels.  To put the issue more 
sharply, it enables a state to maximize its revenue potential while 
minimizing vulnerability to interstate tax competition.10 
 
 The enthusiasm of the ACIR for these changes notwithstanding, little happened in the 
next few decades to diversify the tax structures of the fourteen states which did not have both 
sales and income taxes. New Jersey adopted a personal income tax in 1976.  This was offset by 
Alaska’s repeal of its state personal income tax in 1979 due to its increasing oil-related 
prosperity. 
 The 1980s ushered in changes in business taxes, largely as a result of changes in 
corporate taxes at the federal level.  The Federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 included provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8Shannon, 1987, p. 12 
9Shannon, 1987, p. 12 
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 that widened the corporate tax base but lowered corporate rates.  States with corporate income 
taxes tended to follow suit, as keeping the state definition of the tax base equivalent to the federal 
definition makes state-level accounting much easier.  Corporate income taxes, which date back 
to 1909, are not the only type of business taxes collected at the state level.  Business franchise 
fees and/or excise taxes are collected in most states, and are either flat-fee taxes or are based on 
business assets (rather than net income). 
 The 1980s ushered in a decrease in state corporate tax revenues.  Though states did not 
generally repeal the taxes, many offered credits and deferments to businesses moving into the 
state.  State competition for economic growth became, and remains, fierce.  The effectiveness of 
these credits and deferments in fueling state income and/or GDP growth is hotly debated.  Since 
these tax expenditures are made to corporations through the tax system rather than through a 
spending mechanism, the details are not generally available to the public.  Most states, as well as 
the federal government, have laws that prevent the disclosure of tax information.  While state 
governments will supply numbers (total tax dollars waived for corporations, etc.), they will not 
generally disclose which companies receive how much in tax breaks.  This makes research on the 
effectiveness of such breaks difficult.11 
 Another “tax” to gain widespread state popularity in the 1980s was the lottery.  Lotteries 
have a long history in the United States.  A lottery was used to help finance the Virginia 
Companies’ Jamestown venture in early colonial America.  By the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, lotteries were common in the colonies, and lottery revenues funded both public and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10ACIR, 1967, p. 21 
11Pomp, 1988, pp. 73 – 76 
 5
 private projects.  Lottery sales were even used to raise a small amount of the cost of the 
Revolutionary War.12 
 As states began to find alternative ways to raise revenue, lotteries began to lose favor.  In 
the nineteenth century, opposition to lotteries grew for two reasons: 
1) Gambling was considered to be morally wrong; and 
2) Lotteries were seen as having ill effects on low-income and minority groups. 
Following Congressional action banning use of the mail for lotteries (1890) and banning lotteries 
from interstate commerce (1895), there were no government sponsored or other legal lotteries in 
the United States until 1964.13  New Hampshire re-introduced the state lottery in 1964 with the 
novel idea of earmarking the funds for education.  Though some other states followed suit, 
lotteries did not begin to turn big profits for states until New Jersey introduced some innovations 
in the 1970s.  Low-priced tickets, instant winners and heavy promotion helped make the New 
Jersey lottery a revenue-raising success.  Many states began to follow suit.  State-operated 
lotteries were one of the fastest-growing industries in the United States in the 1980s.14  By 2001, 
only twelve states had failed to jump on the lottery bandwagon.15 
 
States in Fiscal Crisis 
 
 States spent the latter part of the twentieth century looking for new and less painful ways 
to raise revenues.  While many Americans seemed content to let the briefly projected federal 
budget surplus stay in Washington, state-level taxes have often been under attack.  A 
phenomenon that became known as the Tax Revolt began in the United States during the late 
                                                          
12Borg, Mason & Shapiro 1991, p. 2 
13Ibid 
14Ibid, p. 3 
15International Gaming and Wagering Business, 2001 
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 1970s and continues today.  California’s overwhelming passage of Proposition 13 in June 1978, 
which substantially limited that state’s local governments’ ability to tax property by preventing 
increases in assessed residential property values, marked the beginning of the Tax Revolt.  By 
1982, nineteen states had passed some form of limitation on the level (or growth) of state general 
expenditures or revenues.16  Nonetheless, for many states, a balanced budget law is the only form 
of fiscal constraint facing state government, though a number of other fiscal discipline 
mechanisms (including extraordinary majority votes required for tax increases, line-item 
gubernatorial vetoes, debt limitations and income tax indexation) are in effect in states across the 
country.17 
 The unwillingness of Americans to accept tax increases at the state and local levels 
contributed to fiscal crises in several states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, 
Michigan and Minnesota are some of the more prominent examples) in the 1990s.  Though 
recent economic growth has improved the situation for most states, those with tax systems that 
are relatively unresponsive to growth continue to face revenue shortfalls.  The lack of tax 
increases alone would have been unlikely to cause serious fiscal problems in most states, and 
researchers have identified several contributing factors.  One of the most important was the 
increasing use of unfunded mandates on the part of the federal government.  Education, 
corrections and medical care are among the services on which federal minimum standards have 
been raised, but federal financing of improvements in these services has not kept pace with 
program costs.  Indeed, in some cases no additional federal funds were supplied to meet the 
demands on states of minimum service levels mandated by the federal government.18 
                                                          
16Elder, 1992, p. 47 
17Ibid, p. 51 
18Roin, 1999, pp. 355 - 356 
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  In response to increasing pressure from state and local governments, Congress enacted 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA, PL. 104-4), which took effect on January 
1, 1996.  The UMRA requires Congress to consider the financial impact on state, local, and tribal 
governments and the private sector and to consider whether to provide funding for mandates 
which will cost governments more than $50 million to implement.  The Act defines “mandate” 
very narrowly, however, leaving many programs states must fund by federal regulation out of the 
definition.  Furthermore, Congress can separate mandates into smaller bills, each of which will 
fall below the $50 million mark.  A recent review of Congressional response to the new 
safeguards reports the following: 
In the eight years since UMRA took effect, both the amount of 
information about the cost of federal mandates and Congressional 
interest in that information have increased considerably. In that 
respect, title I of UMRA has proved to be effective. Moreover, 
numerous pieces of legislation that originally contained a 
significant number of unfunded mandates were amended before 
enactment to either eliminate the mandate altogether or to lower its 
costs… Few intergovernmental mandates with costs over the 
UMRA threshold have been enacted into law since UMRA's 
enactment. Only three mandates with annual costs of at least $50 
million became law: an increase in the minimum wage (1996); a 
reduction in federal funding to administer the Food Stamp program 
(1997); and a preemption of state authority to assess a premium tax 
on certain prescription drug insurance coverage (2003). Those 
enacted mandates represent far less than one percent of the 
intergovernmental mandates that the Congress has considered 
since UMRA took effect… Furthermore, four intergovernmental 
mandates that CBO identified as having costs over the threshold 
when they were approved by authorizing committees were 
amended before enactment to bring their costs below the 
thresholds: a requirement for mental health parity in insurance 
plans (1996), a requirement that driver's licenses contain Social 
Security numbers (1996), a preemption of state authority to assess 
fees on certain securities transactions (1997), and a prohibition on 
certain Internet-related taxes (1998). In all of these cases, there is 
evidence that lawmakers altered the legislative proposals 
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 specifically to reduce the costs of federal mandates before enacting 
them.19 
 
 Portions of state budgets that are targeted to compliance with federal mandates are not 
eligible for budget cuts.  This leaves governors and state legislators with somewhat limited 
flexibility to cut spending when citizens choose that alternative over tax increases. 
 
Recession 
 
 The recession of 1990-91 left many states with revenue deficiencies at a time when 
welfare and demand for kindergarten through twelfth grade education, as well as aid for higher 
education, increased.  Between July, 1989 and January, 1992, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) benefits rose 24.8% nationally.  Though the national recession officially ended 
in March, 1991, many states suffered recession effects for varying lengths of time. One fourth of 
the states still had falling employment rates as late as fall of 1993.20  After the strong resurgence 
of most state finances in the late 1990’s, many suffered again with the recession of 2001.  
Several states have not yet fully recovered, though a spate of post-recession state tax increases 
have contributed to healthier state finances in the past few years.21 
 
Medicaid 
 
 Sustained growth in the cost of medical care, coupled with federal mandates requiring 
states to provide more services than many of them had previously offered, caused Medicaid to 
become an increasingly heavy financial burden on states in the early 1990s.  According to the 
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), Medicaid spending from state general 
                                                          
19Gullo, 2004, p. 567 
20Gold, 1995, pp. 6 – 7 
21 Jenny, 2005 
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 funds increased by 16.7% in 1991 and by an additional 19.6% in 1992.22  A booming economy in 
the latter part of the decade helped remove people from Medicaid rolls, but the rapid increase in 
the cost of medical care continues.  A report by the National Conference of State Legislatures’ 
Health Policy Tracking Service notes that states are increasingly dealing with exponential 
Medicaid cost increases by cutting both eligibility and benefits.23 
 
Court Rulings 
 Federal and state court decisions that increased state costs and/or reduced revenues also 
played a role in state fiscal stress.  Many states were forced to spend more on mental health 
programs (due to inadequate care) and on prison systems (due to overcrowding).  Also affecting 
some states were decisions requiring them to pay more to health care providers and to 
fundamentally alter the traditional methods used to fund kindergarten through twelfth grade 
education.  Revenues were adversely affected in income tax states when federal courts required 
state income tax systems to give equally favorable treatment to the pensions of federal retirees as 
they gave to those of retired state and local government employees.24 
 
Tax Systems 
 
 Many states failed to reform their tax systems to reflect changes in the economy, and 
many states found their revenues growing more slowly than personal income.  This phenomenon 
is often described as a tax elasticity problem, where elasticity measures the percentage change in 
tax revenue resulting from a one percent growth in personal income.  Inelasticity is especially 
serious with regard to the sales tax.  Most states tax goods more heavily than services, making 
                                                          
22Coughlin, 1994 
23 National Conference of State Legislatures Health Policy Tracking Service, 2003 
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 sales tax revenues less and less responsive to personal income growth as our economy becomes 
increasingly service-oriented. 
At the same time, personal income taxes have become less responsive to economic 
growth.  In the 1980s, many states indexed the tax to offset the effects of inflation or reduced the 
progressivity of income tax rates.  Both of these actions reduce the elasticity of the tax. 25  Some 
states have not revised their tax rates in twenty years or more, so a large proportion of taxpayers 
are in the highest tax bracket, which also leads to low elasticity.26 
 
Corrections Policy 
 
 The fastest-growing element of state budgets in the 1980s and early 1990s was 
corrections spending, which quadrupled in that time period.  The main causes of the increase 
were tougher sentencing laws and the war on drugs.  The probability of being incarcerated, 
especially for a non-violent offense, is much greater than it used to be.27
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 The Council of State Governments, 2003, pp. 9 – 10 
25Income tax indexation allows a state to adjust its income tax brackets annually by the rate of inflation as 
determined by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  Economists have long argued whether or not the CPI adequately 
represents the inflation rate with many believing that inflation is overstated by the CPI.  If this is the case, then tax 
brackets will creep upward more rapidly than income as indexing adjustments are made.  This reduces the income 
elasticity of the income tax and makes it less responsive to economic growth, though many such income taxes 
remain elastic (tax revenue grows by more than 1% for every 1% increase in personal income). 
26Gold, 1995, p. 11 
27 The Council of State Governments, 2003, p. 5 
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 CHAPTER II 
 
EVALUATING STATE TAX SYSTEMS 
 
 Two types of economic analysis are required in the evaluation of a tax system: positive 
and normative.  Positive analysis is descriptive in nature.  In this type of analysis, one explains 
how the tax system works.  The questions to be answered by positive analysis in the taxation 
context are “Who pays the tax?” and “Who receives benefits from government expenditures?”  
In addition, positive analysis is used to determine the distorting effects of a tax on the economy.  
When the natural workings of a market are impacted by taxation, both market prices and 
quantities are likely to be affected.  When losses to consumers and producers due to a tax exceed 
the revenue raised by the tax, a deadweight social loss occurs.  Minimizing deadweight social 
loss is one goal of positive analysis. 
 Normative analysis is used to judge the outcome in society as a result of a tax.  
Normative analysis attempts to answer questions such as “Who should bear the burden of a tax?” 
and “To what extent should society attempt to redistribute income among its members?”  
Economists approach these questions armed with social welfare theory.  Social welfare theory 
attempts to judge the Pareto efficiency of changes in the economy.  A Pareto efficient outcome 
produces a situation in which no one can be made better off without someone else being made 
worse off in the process.  Many different outcomes may be Pareto-efficient.  Choosing among 
the available Pareto-efficient outcomes is a goal of normative analysis.  Rigorous evaluation used 
to make policy recommendations requires both types of analyses. 
 
 12
 Criteria 
 
 While different sources give many and varied criteria for evaluating state tax systems, the 
literature consistently reflects five basic principles, which are discussed individually below.  Two 
of these rely on the concept of elasticity.  Elasticity is a measure of responsiveness to changes in 
economic conditions.  Price elasticity of demand, for example, measures the responsiveness of 
quantity demanded to changes in price.  When prices change as a result of tax policy, the 
inefficiency created in the market can be determined by measuring the degree to which quantities 
of items demanded change in response.  Price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage 
change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in price.  If the percentage 
change in quantity equals the percentage change in price, the absolute value of the resulting ratio 
is one, and the good or service in question is characterized as having unitary elasticity of 
demand.  It is neither elastic nor inelastic.  If quantity demanded changes by a smaller percentage 
than price, the absolute value of the resulting ratio is less than one, and the good or service is 
described as having inelastic demand.  If quantity demanded changes by a larger percentage than 
price, the absolute value of the resulting ratio is greater than one, and the good or service is 
described as having elastic demand. 
 The concept of elasticity can be used to measure the responsiveness of many economic 
indicators to changes in the economic climate.  Different types of taxes can be compared in terms 
of revenue elasticity to determine their responsiveness to economic growth.  Economic growth is 
generally accompanied by increases in population and income, which increase the demand for 
government services.  The degree to which tax revenues respond to economic growth and/or 
increases in personal income helps determine whether or not revenues will continue to be 
adequate to meet service demands.  The percentage change in tax revenues over time can be 
measured against the percentage change in gross state product or personal income.  Both tend to 
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 move together, but personal income is more commonly used.  Elasticity of tax revenue in this 
case is defined as the percentage change in tax revenue divided by the percentage change in 
personal income. 
 
Efficiency 
 An efficient tax system is one that raises revenue with the least amount of market 
distortion.  Taxing a good or service makes that good or service more expensive to the consumer, 
without increasing the return to the seller.  This gap between what is paid and what is received 
guarantees that the market will not end up at the most efficient outcome.  Taxes on goods and 
services create deadweight social losses.  The revenue raised is less than the combination of 
revenue and consumer and producer surplus lost due to market distortions.   
 These distortions can be minimized by taxing goods and services in inverse proportion to 
their elasticities of demand.  Deadweight social losses occur because the quantity of the good or 
service traded in the market changes when the price of the good increases.  If the revenue raised 
from the tax exactly equals the loss consumers suffer by paying the tax, demand for the product 
is perfectly inelastic and quantities demanded are unaffected by price.  The more inelastic the 
demand, however, the smaller the market distortion due to taxation, and, thus, the smaller the 
deadweight social loss.  If all goods and services are taxed in inverse proportion to their 
elasticities of demand, deadweight social losses due to market distortions are minimized.28 
 
Sufficiency 
 A sufficient tax is one that raises the revenue required.  The fact that many states are in 
fiscal crisis suggests that many state taxation schemes are not sufficient.  Tax systems that are 
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 sufficient for low levels of tax revenue might not be sufficient when called upon to raise higher 
levels of revenue.  As taxes become increasingly burdensome on any particular good, service or 
activity, people are discouraged from further consumption of that good, service or scivity, which 
reduces the tax revenue raised from it.  Furthermore, as income increases, consumption of 
highly-taxed goods and services will not likely rise in tandem, reflecting tax inelasticity.  Thus, 
the income elasticity of the resulting tax revenue is decreased. 
 
Stability 
 Stable taxes are not highly responsive to business cycle fluctuations, and the revenue 
raised from them reflects growth in state population and/or gross state product.  Income taxes, 
for instance, tend to be more affected by business fluctuations than most sales and excise taxes.  
Anything that drives up unemployment or drives down wages will decrease income tax revenue. 
A system relying solely on income taxes will experience revenue fluctuations as the economy 
goes through its normal cycles, and it will not be very stable.  Some types of taxes, such as 
broad-based sales taxes, are stable but produce revenues that lag behind growth.  As income 
increases, consumers tend to save a higher percentage of their income and to spend a higher 
percentage on often untaxed services.  This means that any percentage income increase will 
generally create a smaller percentage increase in sales tax revenue.  Thus, the revenue from such 
a tax can only keep pace with growth if tax rates are increased. 
 
Equity 
 Equity in a tax system can be defined in many ways.  It can be that all people pay the 
same amount.  It can be that all households pay the same amount.  It can be that everyone pays 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 For a full discussion of why deadweight social losses occur, see Rosen, 1995, pp. 328-343. 
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 the same percentage of income/assets.  It can be that everyone pays according to the ability of 
each to do so.  The definition of equity is a matter of opinion, and it is generally a political 
decision made by the peol ein the jurisdiction to be taxed.  It is important for a quality tax system 
to include a definition of equity, and for it to be equitable according to that definition. 
 Equity in tax enforcement is also important.  All citizens must face the same probability 
of being discovered if they dodge taxes.  Due to the budget limits under which they work, 
however, revenue departments choose whom to audit based on the amount of revenue they can 
hope to regain through the audit practice. 
 
Simplicity 
 A simple tax system is important because it minimizes the resources that must be 
committed to tax collection and enforcement.  If people understand their tax system, then tax 
compliance is generally higher, and tax non-compliance is more likely to be intentional.  
Furthermore, complicated tax systems require more resources.  People spend more time figuring 
out what they owe and how to avoid owing as much, often hiring accountants to ensure that their 
tax burden is minimized and they are in full compliance with the law.  The complexity of the 
federal income tax system is almost entirely responsible for the high percentage (more than 50%) 
of tax returns prepared by professional tax services.29 
 Additionally, a complex tax system requires the state to expend more resources ensuring 
compliance.  A simple tax can save time, money and resources for taxpayers as well as for the 
state. 
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 How Different Types of Taxes Rate on the Criteria 
 
 
 
Sales Tax 
 A sales tax is simple.  It is easy to administer and difficult to dodge.  Sales taxes are 
generally collected by vendors for government agencies.  They are among the easiest taxes to 
collect.  In exchange for collecting and remitting sales tax revenues, many states compensate 
retailers by providing a discount of 1 to 5 percent of the taxes collected.30  Retailers, then, have 
little incentive to try to circumvent the tax, and consumers will have to pay it at the point of 
purchase.  If it is set at a high enough rate, it will be sufficient.  Even low general sales tax rates 
produce considerable revenue because of the breadth of the tax base, though many states exempt 
food and other goods considered to be necessities, thus narrowing the tax base and reducing the 
tax revenue.  In addition, relatively low sales tax rates are easier to sell to the electorate than are 
higher property and income tax rates, at least partially because well-designed sales taxes export 
part of the tax to non-residents (and to various extents, to business), shifting some of the tax 
burden.31  
 Problems with sufficiency can come about due to interstate competition.  States lack legal 
authority to require out-of-state vendors to collect and remit complementary use taxes (sales 
taxes charged on items residents buy in other states), and except for a few registered items such 
as motor vehicles, it is difficult to collect from the final consumer.  One of the fastest–growing 
problem areas relates to the fact that sales made in one state for delivery in another are not 
taxable in the former, unless the out-of-state seller also has "nexus" (generally defined as a 
                                                          
30Due & Mikesell, 1994, p. 289 
31Hy & Waugh, 1995, p. 82 
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 physical presence) in the purchaser’s state.32  While mail order sales used to be the primary 
beneficiary of this loophole, television, telephone and internet sales now benefit as well.  
Congress has recently legislated a moratorium on new internet sales taxes.33  Internet sales are 
likely to increase exponentially over the next decade or so, and state sales tax revenues may be 
significantly adversely affected.34 
 Sales taxes tend to get low marks for efficiency, stability and equity.  Sales taxes are 
rarely charged at different rates for different goods and services.  They do not take the elasticity 
of demand for the good or service in question into account.  When they do have varying rates, 
lower rates tend to be assigned to the more inelastic goods and services.  Many states exempt 
food (for home consumption), some clothing, prescription drugs, utilities, and many or most 
services.  Some of these exemptions exist to keep the system equitable.  Demand for a good or 
service is often inelastic if that good or service is a necessity, but taxing necessities means poor 
people pay a disproportionately larger percentage of their income on sales taxes than do 
wealthier people (this is partially addressed by the fact that the federal governments does not 
allow food stamp sales to be taxed in any states).  Taxing all goods and services at different rates 
would be incredibly complex.  While the administration of such varied tax levels is becoming 
feasible as bar-coding of goods for purchase becomes ubiquitous, determining elasticities with 
precision is difficult.  In addition, keeping track of changing elasticities, and updating tax levels 
to reflect them, would be a nearly impossible administrative burden.  Sales taxes will be 
inherently inefficient because the resources required to make them efficient are too great.35 
                                                          
32Due & Mikesell, 1994, p. 12.  Nexus generally refers to physical plant. 
33See H.R. 4105 and  S.442, each known as The Internet Tax Freedom Act 
34Swope, 2000, pp. 20-23 
35Due & Mikesell, 1994, p. 15 
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  A sales tax is often an inelastic tax because, by definition, tax revenues grow slowly in 
response to long term growth and changes in income.  Income increases as a result of higher real 
wages, inflation, and population growth.  As personal income increases, so does the demand for 
public goods.  Education is one of the first areas to require expansion due to population growth, 
but demands for such varied public goods as police service, street maintenance, and garbage 
collection also grow.  Those public services are not subject to sales taxes.  Additionally, because 
of changes in patterns of savings and consumption as income increases, sales tax revenue is 
inelastic.  This implies that sales tax revenue lags behind growth, and a structural deficit problem 
can emerge if the revenue required to fulfill increased demand for public services is not 
available.36 
 Sales taxes are often considered inequitable because they are believed to be regressive. A 
regressive tax is one that takes a larger portion of the income of lower-income groups than of 
those with higher incomes.  This is a result of different spending behaviors: higher-income 
families, on average, save greater percentages of their incomes than do those in the lower-income 
groups, and spend greater percentages on various untaxed services.  Federal surveys of 
household spending behavior consistently reflect this pattern.37  Most studies show that, based on 
these surveys of household spending patterns, lower-income groups pay a higher percentage of 
their income in sales taxes than do higher-income groups.  The difference in burden tends to be 
small among the income groups in the middle 80% of the household distribution.  Burdens on the 
poorest 10% and the wealthiest 10%, however, show significant sales tax regressivity.38  An 
additional equity concern emerges when sales taxes are levied on food and other necessities at 
the same rate as on all other goods and services.  Many states exempt goods considered to be 
                                                          
36The Tennessee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1998, pp. 17-18 
37 Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2001-2002 
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 necessities, as poorer families spend a larger portion of their income on these items than do 
wealthier families.  States that do not exempt such items tend to have more regressive sales taxes 
than those that do. 
 
Income Tax 
 Income taxes can generate substantial revenue at moderate rates, contributing to a tax 
system’s sufficiency.  An income tax can be quite simple or very complex depending upon its 
structure.  Flat-rate taxes are simple and easy to administer.  Graduated-rate taxes can be slightly 
more complex, but a good tax guide will get most taxpayers through it fairly easily.  Deductions 
are what make most income tax systems complex.  Tax systems allowing itemized deductions 
are generally accompanied by a complex set of regulations.  Considerable time and resources can 
be spent by both taxpayers and tax administrators as a result of itemized deductions.39  States can 
minimize the additional burden to taxpayers by adopting the federal definition of adjusted gross 
income, and thereby not require taxpayers to calculate a totally different starting point.  Since 
most taxpayers must file federal tax returns, the use of federal tax definitions reduces additional 
filing burdens. 
 Itemized deductions are also a source of inequity in income tax systems.  Many 
deductions come about as the result of lobbying efforts by higher-income groups, corporations, 
state governments, and certain industries.  Without much political influence, poorer families tend 
to have few, if any deductions (though the income equivalent of many subsidized social services 
received by poor families often need not be reported).  Deductions can also contribute to 
inefficiency.  In an attempt to shelter income from taxation, people put their money in sheltered 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
38Due & Mikesell, 1994, pp. 9-12 
39Hy & Waugh, 1995, pp. 53-56 
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 investments.  This alters investment patterns, and can cause over-investment in tax-deductible 
areas.40 
 Income taxes are generally more progressive than other types of state taxes. A tax is 
progressive if tax rates rise as income rises, meaning that more affluent people pay a larger 
percentage of their incomes than do their less wealthy counterparts.  If a flat tax rate is used, the 
tax still tends to be progressive because a fixed amount of income is usually exempt from 
taxation.  As income increases, the exempt amount becomes a smaller percentage of total 
income, and the percentage of income taxed thus becomes a larger percentage of total income.  
Income tax schemes with graduated rates (the rate increases as income increases) are generally 
more progressive than flat-rate taxes.41 
 Income taxes can, however, cause inefficiency in the labor market.  The difference 
between the salary an employer pays and the salary an employee receives can be quite 
substantial.  As one’s income increases, the portion of new income that goes to taxes generally 
increases as well.  It is argued that this depresses the labor market and discourages workers from 
pursuing advancement.  The structure of the tax can make a difference here.  A flat-rate income 
tax could discourage workers from entering the labor market, but should not discourage them 
from pursuing advancement.  If an income tax depresses the labor market, state revenues can 
suffer substantially from slower economic growth, stagnant economies, or recessions.42 
 Income taxes are mixed in their stability ratings.  Revenues from income taxes are 
dependent on business cycles; recessions cause decreases in income tax revenues.  Income taxes 
do, however, keep pace with economic growth.  One of the first results of economic growth is 
                                                          
40Ibid, p. 52 
41Galper & Pollock, 1988, p. 124 
42Several sources offer a full discussion of the effects of income taxation on the labor market.  See, for instance, 
   Brown, 1983 
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 increased employment, and income tax revenues reflect the additional wages immediately.  
Because revenues do not rely on the portion of new income spent on consumption, changes in 
wages are fully reflected in changes in income tax revenue.43  Income tax stability varies among 
states, with differences mostly attributable to the tax structure, the types and relative amounts of 
income received, and the sensitivity of the state’s economy to the national economy. 
 
Business Tax 
 The simplicity of a business tax, again, depends on its structure.  Its sufficiency depends 
on the tax base and level at which it is levied.  Stability depends somewhat on structure.  
Business income tax revenues are subject to cyclical peaks and troughs as are personal income 
tax revenues.  Gross receipts taxes, taxes based on total revenue rather than on profit, also face 
cyclical peaks and troughs.  Taxes on business assets are more stable than taxes on business 
income, but asset-based taxes are still sensitive to large booms and recessions.  Franchise fees 
(generally flat taxes on some measure of business activity, such as assets, required in order 
legally to run a business) are the most stable of business taxes.  Only a recession that caused 
many businesses to close down or substantially curtail operations would cause a decline in 
franchise fee revenue. 
 The efficiency of business taxation again depends upon the type of tax.  Corporate 
income taxes raise the same efficiency questions as do personal income taxes.  If investment is 
discouraged because of business taxation, economic growth can be slowed.  Personal income 
taxes discourage labor in the production mix, and corporate income taxes discourage capital 
investment.44  Asset-based taxes would likely cause the same problems because capital 
                                                          
43Holcombe & Sobel, 1997, p. 42 
44Myles, 1995, pp. 247 - 254 
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 investment tends to be investment in assets.  Gross receipts taxes may cause less distortion 
because taxing total revenue implicitly taxes all inputs, rather than just capital.  Flat-rate 
franchise fees are unlikely to cause much distortion.  It is possible that some small businesses 
would find them prohibitive, and, thus, would be unable to start or maintain operations, but most 
franchise fees are not set at prohibitive levels. 
 Arguments concerning equity come from both sides of the business tax question.  Some 
argue that taxing business revenue can be a form of double-taxation.  Despite the fact that most 
businesses are taxable entities, they are not people.  Income does not go to the business and stop 
there.  It is spread among owners, managers/employees and shareholders.  Income that is taxed 
once at the business level will generally be partially taxed again when it reaches its final 
destination.  The other side argues that incorporation carries legal and economic privileges and 
that the gains and benefits resulting from these privileges should be taxed.  One such privilege is 
the limited liability that shareholders enjoy in the case of bankruptcy.45  Additionally, income is 
“double taxed” in many cases.  Wages, for example, are taxed through income and payroll taxes, 
but these same wages are taxed again through all other taxes that wage earners pay on 
consumption, property, etc. 
 Others argue that corporate profits are at least partially a result of government goods and 
services, like interstate, railroads, a trained and able work force, etc.; and that corporations 
should be required to pay their fair share toward such goods and services.46  In addition, there are 
concerns that allowing business income to remain untaxed encourages business owners and 
shareholders to leave income “officially” reinvested in the business.  Without business income 
taxes, this reinvested income will not be taxed, and it can (and is) used to purchase non-business-
                                                          
45Ibid, p. 234 
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 related assets for use by owners and shareholders.  Vacation timeshares, company cars, country 
club memberships, tickets to arts or sporting events, and travel-related expenses are some of the 
uses for “reinvested” business income. 
 The gross receipts tax is one form of business taxation that is generally poorly-regarded 
among those who study tax systems, but it is still used in some states.  As its name suggests, a 
gross receipts tax is charged to a business on the basis of revenue rather than profit.  A company 
that makes and sells expensive goods might have much higher revenues than one that makes and 
sells less expensive goods, yet their profits could be quite similar.  The company selling the 
expensive goods would be penalized by a gross receipts tax, and could find this tax a significant 
burden to continued operation.  Gross receipts are not the best measure of corporate assets or 
corporate profits, and can thus distribute the tax burden inequitably among different types of 
businesses. 
 Interstate tax treatment of businesses is also an equity concern.  Businesses bring jobs, 
and employment increases are good for state economies, as well as for re-election campaigns.  
Many states offer tax credits to encourage businesses either to expand in the state or relocate to 
the state.47  For businesses that would find relocating prohibitively expensive (such as auto 
manufacturers), tax breaks will rarely be offered, as the threat of losing the employer is reduced.  
The increasingly service-oriented nature of our national economy has made businesses generally 
more mobile and, thus, more able to negotiate favorable state and local tax treatment. 
 
Excise Taxes 
 Excise and commodity taxes are selective sales taxes.  True sales taxes are levied only on 
purchases made at their final stage and are collected from sellers.  Selective sales taxes are 
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 usually included in the retail price of a purchase, with wholesalers acting as collection agents of 
the government.  Excise and commodity taxes are levied on designated types of commodities, 
predominantly motor fuels, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages.  These taxes are designed to raise 
revenues, although some are also intended to discourage certain types of behavior.  Moreover, 
excise and commodity tax revenues are often earmarked for particular purposes, while sales and 
use tax revenues are usually deposited in the government’s general fund.48 
 Excises taxes alone are very unlikely to provide sufficient revenue to a state government, 
but they can be dependable, stable sources of additional revenue.  The products on which excise 
taxes are most often levied tend to be products with inelastic demand.  To the degree that the 
state sales tax rate is too low to optimally tax these inelastically-demanded goods and services, 
excise taxes can increase efficiency in a state tax system.49  If states raise excise tax rates, 
however, consumers are motivated to purchase taxed goods in other states with lower excise tax 
rates when possible. 
 Excise taxes are simple taxes.  They are usually paid by manufacturers or wholesalers, 
and are passed on to consumers via higher product prices.  If higher prices might decrease usage 
(due to strong competition or elastic demand), manufacturers will end up bearing some of the tax 
burden themselves.  They may alleviate the burden somewhat by lowering expenses, such as 
employee wages.50  Excise and commodity taxes are most often levied as per-unit taxes or ad 
valorem taxes, making tax burden easy to figure.  Compliance is not as easy to track as it is in the 
case of sales taxes, especially when states have significantly different excise tax levels on 
products.  Consumers can purchase taxed goods in a neighboring state with lower tax rates on 
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 that good, and state governments have no effective method for tracking such activity, nor any 
legal method for preventing it.51 
 The stability of an excise tax system depends upon the income elasticity of the taxed 
goods.  Consumers’ purchases of sin-tax items (such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco) are 
very stable over the business cycle because they do not fluctuate much when income fluctuates.  
Luxury-tax goods are much less likely to produce stable revenues, because consumer purchases 
of these goods do fluctuate with income fluctuations.52 
 Excise taxes on goods other than luxury items tend to be quite regressive.  Hy and 
Waugh53 report that, as income for a family of four rises, the percentage of income paid as excise 
and commodity taxes decreases.  Using data from 1991, they find the following: 
Families with a household income of less than $13,000 per year 
pay almost two percent of their income in excise and consumption 
taxes.  By contrast, families making $54,000 per year pay less than 
half that amount.  Of all the excise and consumption taxes, tobacco 
and alcoholic beverage taxes are the most regressive, while food 
and lodging taxes are the least regressive. 
 
 
State Lotteries 
 Like the excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, the implicit lottery tax rate is quite high, 
but, unlike the taxes on alcohol and tobacco, the purpose of the high marginal tax rate is not to 
discourage consumption.  Rather, the purpose is to raise as much revenue for the state as 
possible.  In order to gain approval for a state lottery, many states earmark the potential lottery 
                                                          
51Rosen, 1995, pp. 477-478 
52Holcombe &  Sobel, 1997, pp. 68-69 
53Hy & Waugh, 1995, pp. 114-118 
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 revenues for specific purposes (e.g., education, elderly services, or other socially advantageous 
alternatives).  Borg, Mason, and Shapiro54 report the following: 
The results of various studies indicate that whether lottery 
revenues are designed to supplement education or some other 
earmarked beneficiary (for example, programs for the elderly in 
Pennsylvania), lotteries have not supplemented the overall 
allocations of their designated beneficiary.  Rather, these studies 
imply that lotteries have replaced previously allocated funding, 
with the end result being that, at least in the case of education, 
funding in those states with lotteries is comparatively inferior to 
funding in those states that have resisted the gambling tax bug. 
 
 In Florida, for example, lottery funds began supplementing educational funding in 1987-
1988.  In 1986-1987, education’s share of the Florida general revenue funds was 61.2%, in 1987-
1988, its share was 59.7%, in 1988-1989, its share was 58.4%, and in 1989-1990, its share was 
57.3%.55  In any case, a lottery is unlikely to provide sufficient funds for a large budget item like 
education.  Lottery dollars are a small part of general revenue for any state.  In 1986, net lottery 
revenues as a percent of state revenues varied from a range of one to five percent, with the 
average being only 3.3%.56 
 The efficiency aspect of a lottery depends upon the demand elasticity for lottery tickets.  
However, since lottery tickets are almost uniformly priced at $1.00, demand elasticity is 
empirically difficult to measure.  Some researchers have looked at how the number of tickets 
purchased varies with potential winnings in order to determine elasticity.  Such studies have 
shown that larger dollar prizes garner proportionately greater ticket sales than do smaller prizes.  
This suggests that demand for lottery tickets is somewhat elastic, and that the lottery tax is, thus, 
likely to be economically inefficient.57 
                                                          
54Borg, Mason & Shapiro, 1991, pp. 12-13 
55Hegarty, 1989 
56Clotfelter & Cook, 1989, p. 37 
57Borg, Mason & Shapiro, 1991, pp. 36-38 
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  Various studies of the income elasticity of lottery tickets (that is, how much lottery ticket 
purchases change with changes in income) show that the number of lottery ticket purchases 
decreases as income rises.  This suggests that state lotteries are not a stable source of income, as 
growth in lottery revenues will not keep pace with a state’s economic growth.  Furthermore, 
Borg, Mason and Shapiro58 conclude the following concerning where lottery dollars come from: 
[L]ottery households spend more on mortgages or rents, groceries, 
tobacco products, gambling activities other than the lottery, home 
furnishings, and home services than identical households that do 
not play the lottery.  Their higher expenditures cannot be attributed 
to higher incomes or demographic differences because these 
factors have been held constant in the regression models.  We also 
know that the only expenditure category in which lottery 
households spend less than their non-lottery counterparts is 
charitable giving… however… lottery households had no 
significant change in their charitable giving relative to non-lottery 
households during [the period in which the lottery was 
instituted]…The only evidence of lottery households reducing their 
expenditures since the lottery began is seen in the alcohol category. 
 
Because little change was seen in the consumption spending of those who buy lottery tickets, 
these results suggest that lottery dollars come mostly from potential savings, and, thus, lottery 
revenues are likely to be unstable over business cycles as well. 
 Lotteries are a very simple tax.  State lotteries are generally privatized, and the state need 
only collect revenues from companies contracted to run lotteries.  States generally retain only 
30% to 40% of total lottery revenues.59 
 As previously stated, most researchers on the subject have found lotteries to be 
regressive.  Lower-income households spend a higher percentage of their incomes on lottery 
tickets than do higher-income households.  In terms of equity, then, state lotteries do not receive 
high marks. 
                                                          
58Ibid, pp. 97-98 
59Ibid, pp. 47-48 
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 Optimal Taxation Theory 
 
 In the optimal taxation literature, the public sector must optimize within the constraints of 
preexisting failures within the private sector.  An individual’s willingness and ability to pay for 
public goods is complicated by the nature of public goods.  Because an individual can see that 
the benefit she gains from a public good is but a very small portion of the benefit gained by 
society, she is tempted to withdraw her monetary support for public goods.  The overall benefit 
to society is great enough that the good will still be provided even if some members of society 
refuse to contribute.  In addition, those who do not contribute generally cannot be excluded from 
the benefits of the public good.  A sufficient, well-trained police force, for instance, protects 
even those who do not pay for it.60 
 Because individuals will attempt to become “free riders” with respect to public goods, 
taxation by government agencies is considered to be necessary, even though it can cause 
deadweight social losses.  Optimal taxation theory begins in a second-best world and attempts to 
optimize taxation and public-good provision from that perspective.  Because markets are 
interconnected, optimal taxation theory takes a general equilibrium approach.  Taxation of one 
commodity will affect that commodity’s prices as well as those of other commodities.  The 
increase in prices of some inelastically-demanded goods will cause decreases in real consumer 
income.  If the amount of the commodity traded in the market is significantly decreased, people 
might lose jobs.  The question optimal taxation theory attempts to answer through general 
equilibrium analysis is "What change in fiscal measures will raise the requisite revenue with the 
least loss in economic well-being?”61 
                                                          
60 For a general discussion of the free riding problem of public goods, see Rosen, 1995, pp. 66 – 71. 
61Haveman, 1994, pp. 247-249 
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  Optimal taxation theory uses a social welfare function to represent the costs and benefits 
of policies to society.  This function is then optimized, and the least distortionary levels of 
taxation and expenditures are derived from the results.  As long as the social welfare function is 
fully defined and accurately represents society, this approach will yield useful results.  
Unfortunately, such a social welfare function would be incredibly complex and is probably 
impossible to define.  Simplifying assumptions which make the problem more tractable are 
generally made, and several guidelines for policy-makers have been derived from the results.  A 
sampling of these guidelines as they relate to commodity taxation follows: 
The inverse elasticity rule62  
 Given the need to collect some amount of revenue via taxes on commodities, set the tax 
rates so that the percentage reduction in the quantity demanded of each commodity is the same.  
This means that tax rates should be inversely proportional to elasticities of compensated demand.  
Compensated demand differs from what one generally thinks of as demand in that income effects 
are removed.  When the price of a good increases because of a tax, one either has less money to 
spend (because some went to pay the tax) or must buy a less-preferred good to avoid the tax.  In 
either case, one has lost something as a result of the tax.  If one is compensated for this loss, so 
that well-being remains unchanged despite the change in the price of the taxed good, then the 
resulting schedule of prices and quantities is compensated demand. 
The leisure-complementarity rule63 
 When there are two commodities that are to be taxed, impose the higher tax on the 
commodity that is more closely associated with the consumption of leisure time. 
                                                          
62Often referred to as the “Ramsey rule,” after the author of one of the earliest papers in this area (Ramsey, 1927) 
63Also known as the “Corlett-Hague rule,” named after the authors of another prominent paper (Corlett & Hague, 
   1953) 
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 The “if equity counts” rule 
 If, in addition to minimizing efficiency losses, society wishes to equalize the distribution 
of well-being, the taxes placed on commodities in whose consumption the well-to-do specialize 
should be higher than the taxes levied on the commodities on which the poor concentrate their 
spending.64 
 Robert Haveman reports on the progress optimal commodity taxation has made over the 
years:65 
Since the early contributions that yielded these rules, optimal 
commodity taxation literature has been expanded in a number of 
ways.  Researchers have relaxed assumptions, introduced 
additional constraints and intertemporal considerations, and 
derived the implications for worlds in which some commodities 
are both consumed and used as inputs, or where duties on imported 
goods exist, or where there are preexisting “market failures” that 
cannot be undone, or where there are administrative costs 
associated with taxing commodities.66 
 
 Optimal income taxation theory attempts, using general equilibrium analysis, to answer 
the question: “Knowing consumer preferences, technology and market structure, and given a 
public revenue requirement to be raised by a distorting income tax, what is the efficient structure 
of the income tax?”67  Early efforts to define optimal income taxation used the “representative 
consumer” model.  In this model, all individuals in society are homogeneous.  The results of this 
simple model of income taxation are quite clear- choose the combination of linear income tax 
with refundable tax credit that simultaneously raises the required revenue and maximizes utility.  
That tax will have a single marginal tax rate and will yield a lower level of utility than would a 
                                                          
64This rule is often known as the “Diamond-Feldstein rule,” after the earliest authors to incorporate the assumptions 
   in their research models (Diamond, 1975; Feldstein, 1972). 
65Haveman, 1994, pp. 247-249 
66Ibid 
67Ibid, p. 250 
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 lump-sum tax.  The utility decrease (in monetary units) is the deadweight social loss of the 
income tax. 
 Results of optimal income taxation analyses vary greatly with the underlying assumptions 
incorporated into the model.  As models have become more complex, including heterogeneous 
consumers with differing and imperfectly substitutable labor abilities, additional guidelines have 
emerged: 
Marginal tax rates should be low (20 to 30 percent)68 
Marginal tax rates are the rates paid on the last dollar earned.  High marginal tax rates can 
discourage people from working more hours, or from working at all, depending on their 
economic circumstances.  Beyond a certain level of income, one which provides necessities and 
some leisure consumption, additional consumption and additional leisure time are assumed to be 
very substitutable.  Under such conditions, if marginal tax rates are too high, people are likely to 
begin consuming more leisure and fewer goods and services; that is, they will work less.  This 
discourages economic growth. 
Marginal tax rates should be generally constant over the income distribution.69 
This conclusion results from the assumption that, once necessities are met, people have 
generally the same elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.  More simply 
stated, as one makes more money, one continues to value leisure at roughly the same percentage 
of income.  If one makes $10 per hour, he will be willing to work additional hours as long as he 
takes home $7 or $8 of the additional hourly income.  If one makes $50 per hour, she will be 
willing to work additional hours as long as she takes home $35 to $40 of the additional hourly 
income. 
                                                          
68Ibid, p. 251 
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 Marginal tax rates should be zero (or even negative) at the highest levels of income.70 
This conclusion results from the assumption that, beyond a certain level of income, 
leisure becomes relatively more desirable than additional consumption.  As long as this (very 
reasonable) assumption is in place, even if equity is a strong consideration in the formation of the 
social welfare function, this result of a zero marginal tax rate on the highest levels of income 
persists. 
This result is dependent, however, on the idea that additional income earned by those at 
the highest levels of income is a result of additional work that contributes to economic growth.  
The exponential increases in compensation at the highest income levels over the last few decades 
at least raise the question of whether or not individuals at those income levels are really doing 
anything to merit the increases.  Some of the more egregious corporate scandals show evidence 
that these income increases are simply gifts that the few in the highest income brackets give to 
one another, to the detriment of stockholders and lower-level employees. 
 The general rules derived from optimal taxation theory suggest that optimal income 
taxation is best achieved by either flat-rate or decreasing-marginal-rate (regressive) tax systems.  
Robert Haveman argues that this conclusion misinterprets the optimal income taxation literature 
by combining portions of different guidelines without all of the assumptions of both:71 
[The] literature…permits the optimal income tax rate schedule to 
have a negative intercept, in effect allowing a refundable tax credit 
to individuals at the bottom of the distribution.  With such a 
negative intercept and proportional marginal tax rates, average tax 
rates will increase over the income distribution.  If tax 
progressivity is defined in terms of average tax rates, an optimal 
linear [flat-rate] income tax can also be a progressive tax.  [Some] 
have taken the conclusion of early analyses (low progressivity) and 
the mathematical form of later analyses ([flat rate] linear tax 
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 schedules) and have persuaded themselves and others that flat 
taxes without income guarantees for the poor are optimal…Those 
advocating this view caricature the optimal income tax literature. 
 
 Despite the general guidelines that have been developed through optimal taxation 
research, economists and public policy analysts tend to agree that the literature does not offer 
concrete guidance on specific policy questions.  Simplifying assumptions are necessary to keep 
optimal taxation models tractable, but these assumptions make the results more useful as 
guidelines than as directives.  If all of the elements of production, worker ability, various taxes at 
all levels of government, heterogeneous consumer utility, and instances of asymmetric 
information could be clearly quantified, then policy analysts would need only to plug numbers 
into the equations and generate optimal results from them.  In this world of perfect information, 
tax efficiency could be achieved by equalizing the marginal deadweight social loss of each type 
of tax.  Such quantification is, however, impossible in any modern society.  For this reason, 
optimal taxation literature cannot offer all the answers concerning tax efficiency to the policy 
analyst. 
 Policy analysts must also consider goals other than efficiency.  Optimal taxation theory 
has not produced much in the way of general principles concerning stability, equity or simplicity.  
These elements could always be added to a tax optimization problem, but only if they are 
precisely defined.  There is no consensus on the definition of an equitable tax system.  Simplicity 
might be defined in terms of cost (both administrative and in terms of taxpayer time), but it 
would be difficult to measure.  Stability is generally one of the first qualities of tax systems to be 
lost in the simplifying assumptions of an optimal taxation model.  Fluctuations in revenue due to 
changing business cycles and patterns of saving and consumption are difficult to predict; they are 
different in different time periods, at different levels of inflation, in different regions of the 
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 country, etc.  Such variation makes general rules difficult to generate, so these variations are 
usually removed from the model.72 
 Empirical research on optimal state tax systems should always include the principles of 
optimal taxation theory, but it must include other approaches as well.  While the complexity of 
modern economies at the state level requires studies of individual tax systems to be very state-
specific, there have been recent attempts to derive general principles concerning tax stability and 
tax system equity through approaches other than constrained revenue maximization. 
 
The Portfolio Approach 
 
 The portfolio approach grew out of reconsideration of revenue stabilization as a goal for 
tax policy analysts.  Though earlier works in public finance stressed the importance of 
stabilization, this goal had, for many years, been lost.  Research in public finance in the early 
1970s insisted on rigorous microeconomic foundations, a requirement that was hard to reconcile 
with the Keynesian macroeconomics of that era.  Since then, the microfoundations of 
macroeconomics have been made much stronger, but the reintroduction of stabilization policy 
into public economics has been slower.73  Fred White introduced the portfolio approach to 
address stability concerns as a consideration in decisions on tax structures.74 
 His theoretical model is based on the trade-off between revenue growth and instability 
(variance of actual tax revenues around expected tax revenues) in tax systems documented in 
much of the mid-century public finance literature.75  Figure 1 shows a set of possible tax 
combinations that make up the theoretical growth-instability frontier.  Point “A” lies on the 
                                                          
72 White, 1983, p. 103 
73Arnott, 1994, pp. 265-266 
74White, 1983, pp. 103-114 
75See Groves, 1952, pp. 87-102; Wilford, 1965, pp. 304-312; and Williams, Anderson & Lamb, 1973, pp. 267-273 
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 frontier, and, thus, is efficient in terms of growth and stability.  Point “B” lies to the left of the 
frontier.  It is inefficient because the tax package described by Point “B” could become more 
stable without decreasing the growth rate, an improvement in quality of the system. 
 
 
C
A
B
 Instability 
 
 
 
 
 Growth Rate 
FIGURE 1: Theoretical Growth-Instability Frontier 
 
 Alternately, the tax package described by point “B” could be made to exhibit greater 
growth without sacrificing stability, also a quality improvement.  Points such as “C,” to the right 
of the frontier, represent unattainable combinations of growth and stability.  The slope of the 
frontier is positive, meaning that the level of instability and the growth rate move in the same 
direction.  The more quickly that revenues grow, the more volatility one observes in annual 
revenues from taxes. 
 White begins by considering the standard deviation of actual tax revenues around 
expected tax revenues.  Expected revenues exhibit unitary elasticity in economic growth, 
meaning that they grow one percent for every one percent increase in gross state product (or 
alternate measure of economic growth).  So, for a given tax: 
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These standard deviations have to be extended to measure instability in a tax structure 
that includes several taxes.  By considering a combination of taxes with varying degrees of 
instability, and by including positive and negative correlations among the taxes in the model, 
White develops a model to minimize instability by diversifying the tax revenue portfolio. 
White models stability measurement through variances and covariances of several taxes: 
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where: 
Ri  is the level of revenue from the ith tax; 
Rj  is the level of revenue from the jth tax; 
σij is the covariance between the ith and jth tax when i ≠ j, or the variance for the ith tax when i = j; 
n is the number of taxes.   
 Equation (2), then, figures the variance of total actual tax revenues around total expected 
tax revenues for a tax system made up of several different types of taxes.  This variance is the 
revenue-weighted sum of the variances of each individual tax, weighted by the portion of total 
revenue that each tax generates.  The variance of each individual tax is the square of its standard 
deviation from equation (1). 
 White’s growth measure for a particular tax structure is defined as the weighted average 
of the growth rates for each individual tax in the system under consideration.  This formulation is 
expressed as: 
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where: 
gT is the projected annual growth rate for the entire tax structure; 
gi is the projected annual growth rate for the ith tax; 
Ri is the revenue from the ith tax; and 
RT is total revenue from taxes. 
The growth rate for the ith tax (gi) is weighted according to Ri / RT, the fraction of total revenue 
generated by the ith tax. 
 White uses a single regression equation to quantitatively estimate both growth and 
stability. 
 

 ++= itit crbtaeR               (4) 
where: 
Rit is revenue from the ith tax in year t; 
t is the time variable indicating year; 
rit is the tax rate for the ith tax in year t; and 
a, b and c are regression coefficients. 
The annual growth rate is the regression coefficient “b” multiplied by 100 to convert it to 
percent, and instability (σi) is calculated from the deviations between actual and predicted 
revenues.  In the case of a linear regression, these deviations equal the residual values. 
 White estimated this regression equation for seven major Georgia state taxes (sales, 
motor vehicle, motor fuel, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, personal income, and corporate) for the 
period 1970 to 1981.  His results show that no single tax combines the highest growth rate with 
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 the least instability, so White concludes that a portfolio of taxes is most likely to produce an 
efficient combination of growth and stability in tax revenues over time. 
 White then uses a quadratic programming model to develop the set of feasible tax 
structures having the property that overall variance is minimum for associated overall growth 
rate.  He defines the quadratic programming model as follows: 
Minimize σ2T 
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where: 
R*T is the desired total revenue from taxes and 
λ is a scalar. 
 The constraints incorporated in the model are of the following form and meaning.  First 
the sum of the individual tax revenues must equal the desired aggregate level of tax revenue, 
assumed to be the state’s 1981 level in this case. 
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Second, the level of revenue from each individual tax must be either zero or positive, which is 
commonly referred to as the non-negativity constraint. 
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 Ri ≥ 0 (for all i, i = 1 to n)                (8) 
 
Third, maximum upper limits are placed on the level of revenue that can be generated from each 
individual tax. 
 
Ri ≤ Li (for all i, i = 1 to n)                (9) 
 
In the base model, the revenue from each tax is allowed to vary between ±100 percent of its 1981 
level.  Thus, the constraint given in equation (9) can be rewritten as: 
 
0 ≤  Ri  ≤  2Ri,1981 (for all i, i = 1 to n)            (10) 
  
The summation term in equation (5) is the overall variance, and the summation term in equation 
(6) is the overall growth rate.  Parameterizing λ from 0 to infinity produces a sequence of 
solutions of increasing overall growth rate and overall variance of tax revenue.  The first solution 
gives the tax structure that can be characterized as the least unstable with the lowest overall 
growth rate.  Additional solutions are obtained for critical turning points, such as that for the 
current overall growth rate and the point where the overall variance is minimum.  The final 
solution in this sequence represents the maximum overall growth rate that can be obtained with 
the specified constraints.  These solutions are sufficient to obtain the efficient growth-instability 
frontier. 
 White’s results show that Georgia was to the left of its growth-instability frontier in its 
actual tax combination.  This suggests that, by changing the tax mix, Georgia could have 
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 achieved greater stability with no loss in growth rate of revenue, or a greater growth rate with no 
loss of revenue stability.  Tax mixes along the frontier vary substantially depending upon the 
levels of growth and stability in the solution.  Motor vehicle and tobacco taxes appear only in 
low growth/low instability solutions.  Personal and corporation income taxes are prominent in 
high growth/high instability solutions.  The alcoholic beverage tax never appears in any of the 
combinations along the efficient growth-instability frontier because it is inferior to other types of 
taxes on both measures.  White makes clear that results are state-specific, and that no general 
rules should be inferred. 
 White’s paper was followed up by Walter S. Misiolek and D. Grady Perdue, who  
examine the same Georgia data, but alter the model to account for inflation.76  Their results are 
summarized as follows: 
[T]he growth-instability frontier which appears to be efficient in 
nominal terms may be quite inefficient when seen from a 
perspective of real revenues…for comparable real growth rates, the 
real frontier portfolios rely less on sales taxes and more on 
personal income taxes and other taxes than the nominal frontier 
portfolios, and have substantially lower real standard deviations.  
The only tax not used in any real frontier portfolio is the corporate 
income tax, and every real frontier portfolio makes use of at least 
five of the seven taxes.  The increased diversification in the real 
frontier portfolios as compared with the nominal frontier portfolios 
occurs because four of the five minor taxes are negatively 
correlated with either the personal income tax or the sales tax in 
real terms.  Only the corporate income tax is positively correlated 
in real terms with both major taxes.  Also having a lower real 
growth rate and a higher real standard deviation than the personal 
income tax, the corporate income tax is the only tax which offers 
no real revenue diversification advantages.77 
 
 Richard F. Dye and Therese J. McGuire took a similar approach using national aggregate 
time-series data to estimate the trend rate of growth and the deviation from trend for several 
                                                          
76Misiolek & Perdue, 1987, pp. 111-114 
77Misiolek & Perdue, 1987, p. 112 
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 components of state general sales and individual income tax bases.78  To analyze separately the 
individual income tax and the general sales tax, they use national data sets that approximate the 
underlying state tax bases.  They estimate trend growth rates as the measure of growth and use 
the deviations from trend to calculate a separate measure of variability.  Because they use 
national data sets to approximate the tax bases for all states, they did not need to track statutory 
tax rate and tax base changes that occurred during the period they analyzed.  The advantage of 
this approach is that they are able to interpret their growth and variability results for any state 
(with more or less confidence, depending on the match between the national data sets and the 
actual state tax bases). 
 The data for the sales tax are from the National Income and Product Accounts, including 
observations on total personal consumption expenditures and on various subcategories of the 
total.  By combining various subcategories, they are able to approximate most states’ sales tax 
bases.  The data used to evaluate the personal income tax are from the Current Population 
Survey.  For each year they calculate the amount of total income attributable to each bracket of 
the income distribution.  They treat the income amounts in the different brackets as components 
of a state’s income tax base.  They use real rather than nominal values for the expenditure and 
income data. 
 Dye and McGuire find that revenue growth and variability are not positively related for 
all components of the state tax bases.  They find that personal spending on consumer services, 
for example, are both slower-growing and more variable than spending on recreation services.  
Also, in comparing possible sales tax structures and possible income tax structures, they find that 
a sales tax with a narrow tax base can be both slower-growing and more variable than a flat 
income tax.  Their results also offer little in the way of general guidelines.  They find that: 
                                                          
78Dye & McGuire, 1991, pp. 55-66 
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 When the underlying growth and variability characteristics of the 
components of the two tax bases are compared, we infer much 
variety in the actual growth and variability of state tax revenues.  
States that include a relatively broad spectrum of consumer 
expenditures under the sales tax can expect growth similar to the 
growth of sales tax revenues for states with narrowly-defined 
bases; the narrow base, however, exhibits much more variability 
than the broad base.  States with virtually flat individual income 
tax structures should experience lower growth and less variability 
than states with progressive individual state income tax structures.  
Given these differences in the growth and variability 
characteristics across tax structures, it is clear that states with 
identical revenue shares for the two taxes can experience 
differences in growth and variability of their tax system revenues 
simply because of structural differences in tax base rules.79 
 
 In a 1991 paper, D. Grady Perdue and Norman L. Weed used a portfolio analysis of 
Texas taxes in an attempt to determine the advisability of offering targeted tax credits for 
economic development.80  They reported that literature on the subject showed little if any 
economic advantage to this strategy.  Perdue and Weed adopted White’s model with only one 
exception: revenue from business licenses was only allowed to vary +100 percent rather than the 
±100 percent allowed for other taxes.  Their basis for this decision was that license fees are 
generally set as low as they can possibly be set while still producing revenue adequate to cover 
the cost of administration and regulation. 
 Perdue and Weed find that the Texas tax structure lands well left of the growth-efficiency 
frontier.  They do not really draw conclusions concerning business tax credits.  They report again 
that the literature offers little support for these policies, and conclude that developing a tax 
structure that is closer to (or on) the efficient frontier is more important. 
 One problem with the portfolio analysis is that growth and stability are not the only 
issues to be addressed when creating or reforming tax systems.  Updates to the model, discussed 
                                                          
79Dye & McGuire, 1991, pp. 64-65 
80Perdue & Weed, 1991, pp. 341-377 
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 below, attempt to include equity, but no attempt has been made to include simplicity (and the 
attendant administrative costs) or efficiency. 
 Oskar Ragnar Harmon and Rajiv Mallick added a new dimension to the growth-stability 
frontier in their 1994 paper examining the New York state tax system.81  Since earlier studies had 
all shown actual state tax portfolios to be well inside (or below, representing inefficient 
combinations) of the growth-stability efficiency frontier, Harmon and Mallick chose to analyze 
how other competing goals, in addition to growth and stability, affect the frontier of optimal tax 
portfolios.  In this paper, Harmon and Mallick introduce tax distributional considerations and 
estimate a three-goal efficiency frontier for New York. 
 Harmon and Mallick use data for the period 1970 – 1991.  They adjust the individual 
revenue series for the effects of tax law changes that took place during that time period.  During 
the period under examination, New York had a personal income tax and a general sales tax 
which together accounted for about 70 percent of total general fund revenues.  In addition, New 
York had 16 other, separate taxes.  To keep the analysis manageable, Harmon and Mallick divide 
those 16 taxes into five groups: transfer (estate and gift, real estate gains and real estate transfer); 
energy (corporate utility and petroleum business); corporate (bank, corporate franchise and 
insurance); sin (alcohol beverage, alcohol beverage license, cigarette and pari-mutuel); and 
transport (highway use, motor fuel and motor vehicles). 
 The data for each tax were tested for trend versus difference stationarity.  If the data were 
trend stationary, tax growth was estimated from the following regression model: 
 
log Ri,t = ai + bi log YEARi,t + ei,t             (11) 
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 where: 
Ri,t is tax revenue of the ith tax in year t; 
a and b are coefficients; 
YEAR is the number of years the particular tax has been in effect; and 
e is the detrended error term. 
If the data were difference stationary (the detrended errors are non-stationary), tax growth was 
estimated from the following regression model: 
 
log Ri,t - log Ri,t-1 = di + ui,t              (12) 
 
where: 
Ri,t is tax revenue of the ith tax in year t; 
Ri,t-1 is tax revenue of the ith tax in year t-1; 
{ui,t} is stationary with mean zero and constant variance σ2; and 
di is a drift term representing long-term expected growth in revenue. 
The instability of each tax was calculated from the variance/covariance matrix of the residuals 
from the above regression models. 
 Harmon and Mallick use the Suits Index, a measure of vertical equity, to measure the 
distributional effects of each tax.82  They make the following observations about the tax groups 
prior to statistical analysis: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
81Harmon & Mallick, 1994, pp. 395-401 
82Suits, 1977, pp. 747-752 
The Suits Index is: 1 – the ratio of the percent of tax burden borne by an income group to the percent of income 
earned by that income group.  The index varies from +1 at the extreme of progressivity where the entire tax burden 
is borne by the members of the highest income bracket, through 0 for a proportional tax, to –1 at the extreme of 
regressivity where the entire tax burden is borne by members of the lowest income bracket.  Consider an economy in 
which there are two income groups.  The wealthier group makes 70% of the income and pays 60% of the taxes.  The 
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 First, the transfer taxes have the greatest growth (10.9 percent) and 
instability (with a standard deviation of 21.9 percent), and are the 
most progressive (with a Suits index of 0.60) of all the tax groups.  
Second, in comparing the characteristics of the income and sales 
taxes, it is seen that the income tax has slightly greater growth (8.4 
percent versus 7.7 percent), slightly less instability (a standard 
deviation of 6.2 percent versus 6.7 percent), and substantially 
greater progressivity (a Suits Index of 0.20 versus –0.12) than the 
sales tax.  And third, the sin and transport taxes are the most 
regressive (their Suits Indexes are –0.16 and –0.27) and have the 
least growth (0.6 percent and 0.2 percent) of all the tax 
groups…Some of the growth, instability, and vertical equity 
characteristics of each tax…are unique to New York’s tax structure 
and may differ from the characteristics of taxes in other states.  For 
example, the New York income tax has a markedly progressive 
Suits Index because its marginal tax rate starts at 4 percent for the 
lowest income level and rises to 7.8 percent at the highest income 
level.  Also, New York’s sales tax may have greater instability 
than sales taxes in other states because the exemption of food, 
prescription drugs, and consumer utilities results in a relatively 
narrow tax base.83 
 
 At the conclusion of the analysis, Harmon and Mallick find that, while New York’s tax 
portfolio is inefficient on the growth-stability efficiency frontier, it is only slightly inefficient on 
the three-dimensional frontier that includes vertical equity.84 
 William M. Gentry and Helen F. Ladd added yet another dimension, “competitiveness,” 
in their 1994 examination of the tax systems of Massachusetts and North Carolina.85  They 
followed a methodology similar to the previous papers, but the included the additional 
competitiveness dimension.  Competitiveness measures effective tax rates relative to the national 
average.  The authors stated that one advantage of the competitiveness measure was to 
incorporate an efficiency component: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Suits Index for the wealthier group in this system would be 1 – (.6/.7) = .143.  For the poorer group, the measure 
would be 1 – (.4/.3) = -.333.  Assuming each group comprises ½ of the population, the Suits Index as a whole would 
be (1/2)(.143) + (1/2)(-.333) = .0715 - .1665 = -.095. 
83Suits, 1977, p. 396 
84Ibid, p. 401 
85Gentry & Ladd, 1994, pp. 747-772. 
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 We incorporate some elements of efficiency by including the 
competitiveness of a state’s tax structure as one of a state’s policy 
goals.  To maintain a competitive tax structure, a state must avoid 
imposing taxes at rates that greatly exceed those in other states, 
thereby minimizing tax-driven economic distortions associated 
with location decisions.  However, our approach ignores 
distortions not associated with differential tax rates across states.  
For example, by not explicitly measuring deadweight loss, we fail 
to capture the advice from economic theory that source-based taxes 
are undesirable on efficiency grounds.86 
 
The authors, like those of the other referenced papers, do not attempt to measure deadweight 
loss.  Such a measure would require knowledge of the shapes of supply and demand curves in 
individual markets as well as their interplay in general equilibrium.  This information is simply 
unavailable and would be impossible to quantify with any level of confidence. 
 The authors reviewed a 21-year period (1970 – 1991) and found that both states 
experienced the fastest revenue growth in their income taxes, which they attributed both to the 
progessivity of the income tax and the accumulation of legislated changes to the taxes.  Sales tax 
revenues grew faster in Massachusetts than in North Carolina, which was consistent with the 
narrower base of the Massachusetts tax.  In both states, the lowest growth rates were associated 
with corporate income taxes and energy taxes. 
 Massachusetts’ taxes showed greater instability in all major categories other than 
corporate income taxes.  The authors pointed out that income instability over the period was 50% 
higher in Massachusetts, accounting for some of the difference.  The remaining differences in 
instability likely result from the tradeoff between growth and instability.  The Massachusetts 
taxes grew faster but were less stable. 
 Equity was measured only for the personal income taxes, sales taxes and selective sales 
taxes.  The authors made the assumption that state policymakers are only concerned with 
                                                          
86Gentry & Ladd, 1994, p. 749. 
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 perceived burdens to individual taxpayers.  Since the incidence of business taxes is unclear, to 
economists as well as to the general public, their equity analysis ignored business taxes.  Using 
elasticity of the tax burden between income classes as the equity measure, Gentry and Ladd 
concluded that both state sales taxes were regressive, though the narrower base of the 
Massachusetts tax, which excludes food, made it less regressive than the North Carolina sales 
tax.  Furthermore, the gasoline tax was regressive in both states, but more so in North Carolina, 
which has a heavier reliance on automobile travel than Massachusetts, especially among lower 
income groups.  Both income taxes were progressive, though North Carolina’s, with its larger 
exemption that mimics the federal tax exemption, was significantly more progressive.  The 
authors incorporated equity into their portfolio model as a constraint, allowing the degree of 
progressivity to vary around the 1991 level within a limited range. 
 For the purposes of description, the authors compared tax rates in each state to the 
national average to determine competitiveness.  North Carolina’s rates were slightly above 
average for energy and wealth taxes, significantly above average for corporate and insurance 
taxes, and substantially above average for income taxes.  The North Carolina sales tax rate was 
well below the average.  Massachusetts was well below the average for sales and energy taxes, 
slightly above average for insurance taxes, well above average for income and corporate taxes, 
and in a league of its own for wealth taxes, with rates that average 256% of the national wealth 
tax average. 
 Gentry and Ladd included competitiveness as a constraint in the portfolio analysis.  They 
defined each state’s revenue from each kind of tax if that state applied the average tax rate to its 
tax base as its tax capacity.  They then measured tax effort, which they defined as the ratio of the 
revenue the state actually collects on a tax to its capacity for that tax.  They constrained the tax 
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 effort of the state to the 95th percentile of tax effort across all states.  Using this formula, they 
found that both states could double their reliance on corporate and sales taxes, and could 
substantially increase insurance taxes, without bumping against the competitiveness constraint.  
On the other hand, neither state had much room to maneuver with its income tax. 
 
 
Micro-Simulation Tax Models 
 
 
                                                          
In a 1988 paper, Harvey Galper and Stephen H. Pollock report on micro-simulation 
models, created for the evaluation of tax systems by Peat Marwick’s Policy Economics Group.87  
Galper and Pollock describe the models thus: 
The micro-simulation model… calculates tax liability for 
thousands of families and individuals (the “micro” units in the 
economy) who are representative of the entire tax-filing population 
of a jurisdiction.  It is the scope and quality of the underlying 
database along with the ability to simulate quickly and accurately 
the effects of major structural tax changes that distinguishes micro-
simulation tax models from the typical representative taxpayer 
approach… The analytical database in its simplest form is a 
statistically drawn sample of tax returns with each return weighted 
so that the sample represents the entire tax-filing population.  A 
sample is used as a lower cost but still highly accurate alternative 
to a data base composed of every tax return filed in the 
jurisdiction.  Ideally, tax returns showing very low and very high 
levels of income are sampled more heavily and thus have lower 
weights.88 
 
 The representative taxpayer model attempts to define, as well as possible, the social 
welfare function from the optimal taxation literature by separating the population into related 
subgroups (usually related by income) and developing a mean taxpayer to represent each group.  
Two traditional problems with representative taxpayer models are their inability to capture the 
effects of a whole range of new policy scenarios and the difficulty in extrapolating future 
87Galper & Pollock, 1988, pp. 107-128 
88Ibid, pp. 112-113 
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 representative taxpayer models from current data.  Because it relies on a larger sample of 
individual behaviors, the micro-simulation tax model allows one to address both of these 
problems with greater effectiveness than does a typical representative taxpayer model. 
 To deal with these problems, the database for the micro-simulation model can be 
enhanced.  One can, with authorization, combine data from state and federal tax returns or 
statistically match tax return data with census data.  The latter approach results in a database that 
contains substantial demographic and economic information including income from nontaxable 
sources (such as transfer payments), an indicator of pension coverage, and an indicator of the 
dependent status of family members.  The census data also contain information on individuals 
and families that do not file tax returns. 
 The data can also be enhanced by the imputation of information gathered from 
independent sources.  Variables that typically are imputed include consumption by type of good 
or service (providing a measure of excise and sales and use tax burden), itemized deductions for 
non-itemizers, industry in which the taxpayer is employed, and student status.  During the 
imputation process, consistency checks are employed to assure that the totals for each of the 
imputed items match the aggregate data. 
 Galper and Pollock contend that the problem of the timeliness of the database can be 
dealt with by extrapolation.  The database is extrapolated to reflect how the jurisdiction’s 
economy will look in years beyond the base year from which the data have been taken.  They 
claim that the detail and quality of the micro-simulation database allows a high level of 
confidence in these extrapolation results.  However, extrapolation of this sort, when combined 
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 with the statistical matching and data combinations already suggested, can make the accuracy of 
the resulting database suspect.89 
 Galper and Pollock used micro-simulation models to estimate the effects of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 on five states: California, Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Virginia.  
These states were selected to represent the various types of tax changes enacted at the state level 
in response to federal tax reform and to provide regional and economic diversity.  Three 
dimensions of each income tax system are examined: the progressivity of each system, the 
revenue responsiveness to real economic growth, and the treatment of low-income taxpayers. 
 Data were gathered on the distribution of income for the nation as a whole and for each 
selected state.  Progressivity of state and federal income tax systems, both pre- and post-reform, 
are deduced from these data.  Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, on a national level, middle- 
and lower-income families claimed a smaller share of income than their share of the population, 
but they paid an even smaller share of tax.  After tax reform, the share of tax liabilities paid by 
this group declines, and the share paid by upper-income taxpayers increases, reflecting a tilt 
toward even greater progressivity. 
 All of the states also showed varying degrees of increased progressivity following tax 
reform.  A major reason in all cases is the inclusion of all capital gains (rather than only 40% 
under previous law) and the elimination of tax shelters, such as real estate partnerships.  As a 
result of these changes, taxable income increased by a much larger proportion at high income 
levels than at lower income levels.  The income tax in Colorado became much more progressive 
even with a system having a single tax rate.  This result occurred because under the prior law the 
top rate came into effect at a low income level ($14,150), while under the new law the personal 
exemption and the standard deduction were increased to the higher federal levels.  The Virginia 
                                                          
89 Citro, 1991, pp. 74 - 77 
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 income tax also became more progressive as a result of both a higher income threshold for the 
top tax rate (from $12,000 to $17,000) and a larger standard deduction and personal exemptions. 
 The California income tax became more progressive despite the flatter rate schedule 
because of more liberal credits, stricter conformity to federal Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), and 
an increased minimum tax.  The Oklahoma tax system became more progressive because the tax 
base was broadened at higher income levels due to changes in the federal AGI.  Also the lower 
federal income taxes imply increased state income taxes for those taxpayers claiming the 
deductibility option for the state.  Progressivity of the Nebraska and federal tax systems did not 
change much because the higher personal exemptions and standard deductions were offset by a 
flatter rate schedule. 
 The federal and state tax systems became less elastic with respect to income after tax 
reform despite the increase in progressivity of each.  Prior to tax reform, the real elasticity of the 
federal income tax and the income tax systems of California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma were all 
in the vicinity of 2.0; that is, a 5% increase in real income across the board would increase tax 
liabilities by 10 %.  For Colorado and Virginia, the elasticity was on the order of 1.5; a 5% 
increase in real income would increase liabilities by 7.5%.  The relative elasticities across states 
roughly matched the relative progressivity indices prior to tax reform. 
 After tax reform, however, each of the income tax systems examined by Galper and 
Pollock had lower elasticity.  The reason for this outcome is that the elasticity measures are 
dominated by the flatter rate schedules and lower rates at the top of the income scale, whereas 
the progressivity measures are more affected by the reductions at the bottom.  As incomes grow, 
the flatter rate schedules generate less revenue than did the prior structure.  Nonetheless, at the 
time they were introduced, the new systems were more progressive. 
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  Oklahoma had the largest relative change in its elasticity.  This is because many of its 
taxpayers were induced to switch from the highly progressive tax schedule, under which federal 
tax payments are deductible, to the flatter tax schedule with no deduction for federal taxes.  Due 
to the implications of the new, flatter rate schedules, tax changes that are revenue neutral in the 
short run may not be revenue neutral over time.  In a few states, such as Nebraska and 
Oklahoma, the changes are fairly significant (a decline in elasticity of 12% and 14%, 
respectively). 
 The number and percentage of families with positive tax liabilities by state under the new 
federal and state tax laws decreased.  This was primarily due to higher personal exemptions and 
standard deductions.  The number of families with state income tax liabilities greater than federal 
income tax liabilities (before the earned income credit) decreased in every state except 
Oklahoma, which did not change its tax schedule.  Thus, the states examined by Galper and 
Pollock in this paper did an even better job than the federal government in reducing taxes for 
lower-income taxpayers.  After tax reform, there are fewer anomalous cases of taxpayers who 
pay higher taxes to their state governments than they pay to the federal government. 
 Galper and Pollock conclude the following: 
This [paper’s] primary message is that computer-based micro-
simulation tax models can be extremely useful tools in analyzing 
federal and state tax policies.  We have used these tools to examine 
the federal and selected state individual income tax systems before 
and after tax reform.  Three dimensions of each income tax system 
have been examined: the progressivity of each system, the revenue 
responsiveness to real economic growth, and the treatment of low-
income taxpayers…Our findings are that each of the tax systems 
examined became more progressive after tax reform but also less 
productive of revenue with respect to real economic growth.  At 
the same time, thousands of federal and state taxpayers have been 
removed from the tax rolls and, with the exception of one state, 
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 fewer taxpayers pay higher income taxes to the state than to the 
federal government.90 
 
As data from each source are added to the model, one must make statistically valid linkages to 
the taxpayers in the sample.  Tennessee does not have enough specific information on its 
individual taxpayers (due to the lack of the individual tax forms that come with a state income 
tax) to hope to compile enough data to do a thorough microsimulation model.
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 CHAPTER III 
 
THE TENNESSEE TAX SYSTEM 
 
 
A Brief History of Taxation in Tennessee 
 
 Tennessee became the sixteenth state of the United States on June 1, 1796.  As part of the 
requirement for application for statehood, Tennessee had called a constitutional convention and 
approved a constitution earlier in 1796.  This first state constitution made the following 
provisions for the raising of revenue by the state:  
All lands liable to taxation in this state held by deed grant or entry, 
shall be taxed equal and uniform, in such a manner that no one 
hundred acres shall be taxed higher than another, except town lots, 
which shall not be taxed higher than two hundred acres of land 
each.  No free man shall be taxed higher than one hundred acres, 
and no slave higher than two hundred acres on each poll.91 
 
 Changes in Tennessee’s population and demographics, among other issues, led Governor 
William Carroll to call a constitutional convention in 1834, which produced a new state 
constitution that was ratified by the people in 1835.  Some significant changes were made in 
several areas, including major changes in the judicial system and the system of taxation.  The 
new provisions with regard to taxation permitted the legislature to tax “land, slaves between the 
ages of twelve and fifty years, and such other property as it deemed expedient.”92  In the 
constitution of 1834, property was to be taxed according to its value, rather than under the flat 
tax system adopted in 1796.  The legislature was not allowed to tax articles manufactured of the 
produce of the state, other than to charge any applicable inspection fees.  Poll taxes were 
continued, and the tax base was enlarged to include merchants, peddlers, and privileges.  The 
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 general assembly could delegate taxing power to counties and incorporated towns, but only to 
the extent that the taxes they levied followed the principles established for state taxation. 
 In the aftermath of the Civil War, Reform Governor William G. Brownlow served as 
Tennessee’s chief executive.  Anyone who had participated in fighting the Union was 
disenfranchised, while former slaves were freed and enfranchised.  This dramatic shift in 
political power was much resented by those who lost their right to vote, and the resignation of 
Governor Brownlow (tendered so that he could accept a United States Senate seat) in February 
of 1869 paved the way for change.  Speaker of the Senate Dewitt Senter became Governor at the 
resignation of Brownlow, but a general election was to be held later that year.  Though Senter 
had supported Brownlow’s policies, he campaigned on the policy of re-enfranchisement of a vast 
majority of white, male Tennesseans.  The number of people voting in the 1869 election left no 
doubt that Senter had, in fact, re-enfranchised these citizens prior to the election, and that they 
had voted almost exclusively for him.  His opponent appealed to Washington to investigate the 
election for fraud, but neither President Grant nor Congress chose to intervene.93 
 Governor Senter called a constitutional convention in 1870, and Tennessee’s current 
constitution was born.  The post-Brownlow anti-government sentiment ran high, and 
Tennessee’s newest constitution reflected a great distrust of state government.  While provisions 
for taxation were not seriously altered, the state government was restricted from investing in 
private corporations or railroads, as the Brownlow government had left Tennessee with a 
substantial debt due mostly to embezzled and misused railroad investments.  In addition, the 
legislature was prohibited from spending more in any given year than was available from 
revenues and reserves.94 
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  Tennessee faced a tax crisis in the early 20th century, as the economy moved from one 
based on agriculture to one based on business and industry.  By the Roaring Twenties, most 
Tennesseans were no longer farmers, and the property tax on which the state relied for most of 
its income was no longer adequate.  The tax burden fell heavily on some Tennesseans, and not at 
all on others.  The state found itself unable to fund even the modest level of government services 
provided during that era.95 
 The biggest obstacle to tax reform was the uniform rule of taxation, which stated that all 
property must be taxed at the same rate.  Several arguments were made against this provision, 
including:  
1) the requirement is impractical because some forms of property cannot be discovered by 
the government; 
2) valuing some kinds of property is difficult; 
3) the state was prevented from applying different kinds of taxes to different kinds of 
property in order to distribute the tax burden more equitably or to achieve other social or 
economic goals; and 
4) taxing corporate wealth as well as income from stocks and bonds is a form of double 
taxation.96 
 In 1923, Governor Austin Peay pushed through tax reform that adapted Tennessee’s tax 
structure to the 20th century economy.  He replaced the property tax with others that applied 
more broadly but at lower rates, including selective sales taxes on items such as liquor, tobacco, 
gasoline, and guns.  Tennessee sales taxes are considered to be privilege taxes, and, therefore, 
may be charged at non-uniform rates.  The most controversial of the new taxes was the corporate 
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 excise tax, levied at 3% of net earnings.  The tax was immediately challenged on the grounds 
that it unconstitutionally violated the uniformity clause.  The Tennessee Supreme Court 
sustained the act, finding that the tax was one on the privilege of doing business in Tennessee, 
and that a privilege tax need not be levied uniformly.  Governor Peay’s reforms, combined with a 
large increase in the state’s long-term debt, stabilized the budget and made possible 
improvements that ushered in a period of progress for Tennessee.  Among the new areas of 
government spending were better funding for public education, the first state funds for colleges 
and universities, the first good roads spanning the state, and the beginnings of the state park 
system and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.97 
 Governor Henry Horton presided over the passage of the next controversial tax, the Hall 
Income Tax, in 1929.  This tax was levied at the rate of 5% on income from stocks and bonds, 
though the ad valorem tax on stocks and bonds was simultaneously removed to meet 
constitutional requirements.  A constitutional challenge to this tax was also mounted and lost.  
The Tennessee constitution makes only one mention of income taxation, in Article II, Section 28, 
which states that “The Legislature shall have the power to levy a tax upon incomes derived from 
stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad valorem.”  The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the right 
of the legislature to levy the tax, finding that the clause was to be interpreted as being an 
exception to the general rule that all property be taxed according to value.98 
 Testing their earlier constitutional successes, legislators passed an income tax in 1931.  
After some debate, it was levied progressively on personal incomes and as a flat rate tax on 
corporate incomes.  A rival plan had attempted to classify “any business, trade, calling, 
occupation, profession, or employment in the State of Tennessee for profit” as a privilege, and 
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 thus open to taxation in whatever form the legislature saw fit.  The court had previously found 
that “A privilege is whatever the Legislature may choose to declare to be a privilege and to tax as 
such,” so constitutional problems were expected to be avoided.  The success of other states in 
introducing income taxes despite constitutional language similar to Tennessee’s, however, led 
the legislature to adopt a straightforward income tax.  When the court challenge came, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court found that: 
1) The constitution in Article II, Section 28, establishes a general rule of taxation, which is 
that property shall be taxed uniformly and equally, according to value. 
2) The provision conferring upon the legislature power to tax incomes derived from stocks 
and bonds that are not taxed ad valorem is an exception to the equality and uniformity 
clause. 
3) In granting power to tax particular incomes, the constitution thereby denies, by 
implication, the right to tax other forms of income. 
This decision left the legislature seemingly unable to tax non-security-derived income at 
all without a constitutional amendment.99  Current legal opinion generally holds that a uniform 
income tax could pass constitutional muster as a property tax, and that a tax on the privilege of 
working in the state might be levied progressively without violating the state constitution.100  
Any new income tax is certain to undergo a constitutional challenge, the outcome of which will 
likely depend upon the ideological makeup of the Tennessee Supreme Court at the time. 
Minor changes were made to the tax system over the next ten years, including an 
additional privilege tax on Tennessee businesses, and some expansion of the excise tax (though 
not beyond a list of items specified by the legislature).  Governor Hill McAlister attempted to 
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 pass a general sales tax in 1935, but it was ultimately defeated in a bitter political fight.  
Governor Jim McCord, in a successful effort to establish a minimum wage scale for teachers and 
modernize Tennessee schools, pushed a 2% general sales tax through the legislature in 1947.  
McCord had been the candidate of choice of former Memphis Mayor, and powerful political 
“boss,” Ed Crump.  McCord failed in his bid for a third term as Governor, as former Governor 
Browning, returning from the battlefields of WWII, hooked up with sales tax opponents and took 
on his nemesis, Crump, and Crump’s boy, McCord.  Browning, Governor again after a 12-year 
hiatus, successfully increased public school spending and attempted to make some constitutional 
changes affecting taxation that failed at the time, but which reappeared later under Governor 
Frank Clement.101 
The period 1953 to 1971 in Tennessee is often referred to as “the Clement-Ellington 
years.”  Frank Clement was Governor from 1953 to 1959, and again from 1963 to 1967.  Buford 
Ellington, Clement’s close friend and Cabinet member, led the executive branch from 1959 to 
1963, and again from 1967 to 1971. 
Governor Frank Clement fought for, and won, an increase in the sales tax from 2% to 3% 
during his first two terms in office, as well as an extension of the sales tax to cover utility 
services.  Ellington campaigned on a platform of “no new taxes,” as he deemed the additional 
revenue from the recent increase sufficient for his programs.  In his third term, Clement 
eschewed tax issues and concentrated on state congressional apportionment and civil rights.  
Ellington moved back to tax issues in his third term, pushing for a constitutional convention.102 
A limited constitutional convention and public referendum in 1971 succeeded in 
modifying the uniformity clause of the State Constitution, allowing, for the first time, the 
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 classification of property to achieve non-uniform tax rates.  The amendments that emerged from 
this convention were approved, and concluded that property fell into three categories (personal, 
tangible and intangible), and that tangible property could be divided into four categories with 
different assessment rates for each category: 
1) Public utility property was to be assessed at 55%; 
2) Industrial and commercial property were to be assessed at 40%; 
3) Residential property was to be assessed at 25%; and 
4) Agricultural property was to be assessed at 25%. 
5) The convention also established a personal property tax exemption of $7,500, 
and allowed for legislative tax relief to the elderly and needy.103 
A tax modernization and reform commission created in 1972 was the first to report that 
Tennessee’s tax structure was deficient in two major areas: it is significantly regressive at low 
levels of income, and it is relatively unresponsive to economic growth.  But, in 1972, in the 
midst of extreme civil rights disputes in the south, Tennessee elected its first Republican 
governor in over 50 years, Winfield Dunn.  Governor Dunn had several spending programs in 
mind, and he battled the legislature for a spending increase, including a proposal for a state 
income tax.  Dunn’s programs, including a statewide kindergarten program, improved conditions 
in mental health facilities, and a pay raise for a portion of state employees who he deemed 
underpaid, were funded through a 0.5% sales tax increase.  The legislature approved his increase 
in one of their longest and most heated sessions, but they did cut a third of the proposed spending 
from his budget, reducing the scale of his programs.104 
                                                          
103 Smith, M. Lee, 1998, pp. 11-12 
104 Corlew, 1990, p. 589. 
 61
 Governor Dunn floated the idea of a state general income tax as tax revenue fell in the 
recession of the mid-70s, but the legislature never gave the issue consideration.  Governor Ray 
Blanton, who succeeded Governor Dunn, got his legislation for a sliding rate progressive state 
general income tax to the floor of the legislature, but there it died.105 
When Governor Lamar Alexander took office in 1979, he proposed new spending for 
education in the form of merit pay for successful teachers.  It was an expensive program, and the 
sales tax was raised to 5.5% in order to pay for it, as well as for other new and existing programs.  
At that point, Tennessee had the highest combined state and local sales tax rate in the nation, and 
counties along the state’s borders were beginning to complain that their customers were crossing 
into Tennessee’s border states to make purchases at a lower sales tax rate.106 
Governor Ned McWherter and Governor Don Sundquist both waited until their second 
terms to attack the explosive issue of tax reform.  McWherter proposed a 4% flat income tax on 
federally adjusted taxable income, and he visited every county in the state in his attempt to sell it, 
but the legislature would not follow.  In the next election cycle, many Democratic legislators 
thought it necessary to sign “No Income Tax” pledges in order to keep their seats.107 
McWherter also obtained the first Medicare waiver granted to a state and developed 
TennCare, a program designed to insure more people while reducing health care costs to the 
government.  It has, indeed, insured more people, but it has failed to reduce expenditures.  
Tennessee’s health care expenditures have skyrocketed along with the country’s as a whole.  
TennCare is one of the first programs that anti-tax advocates propose to put on the chopping 
block whenever revenue shortfalls threaten. 
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 Governor Sundquist initially began with a proposal to lower sales taxes, remove the sales 
tax from food, and reform and raise business taxes.  The average voter had no quarrel with this 
plan, but the legislators feared the loss of jobs and were generally too beholden to business 
interests to give it any consideration.108  Governor Sundquist regrouped and came back with a 
revised plan with fewer cuts to the sales tax and a smaller increase to businesses, but the 
legislature remained unmoved.  Finally, Governor Sundquist proposed an income tax, and a 
small, but highly vocal, part of the Tennessee citizenry exploded.  In the end, legislators rejected 
the income tax, amidst a rowdy demonstration by anti-tax activists.  When the legislature 
cobbled together a budget that relied on tobacco settlement funds to balance, Governor Sundquist 
gave it a resounding veto.  The legislature overrode his veto, but the subsequent downgrading of 
Tennessee’s bond rating left lawmakers aware that the tax issue would be back to haunt them in 
the near future. 
Debate during recent tax reform efforts has been fierce, and a summary of some of the 
arguments gives a fair picture of the daunting challenges facing anyone who tries to reform the 
Tennessee tax system, especially if that reform includes an income tax.  The April 20th, 1999 
Tennessean sported the following headline on its local news front: “State Income Tax Gains 
Steam.”  The next day, two headlines countered: “Senate’s Stall Could Kill Income Tax Deal” 
and “Anti-Tax Barrage Hits Fast.”  The latter quoted several state lawmakers who said the faxes, 
e-mails and telephone calls opposing the income tax were coming fast and furiously.  “I don’t 
want to use a four-letter word,” the story quoted Senator Lincoln Davis (D-Pall Mall) as saying, 
but “People are using four-letter words in saying ‘no.’” 
After a public opinion poll showed much skepticism of the Governor’s claims of a 
revenue shortfall without new tax revenue or new spending cuts, Sundquist’s press secretary said 
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 “I think the governor would challenge anyone who believes that to please send him 
recommendations on exactly what we’re going to cut.”  Taxpayer answers were always the same: 
“Cut waste, fraud and abuse in TennCare.”  Few taxpayers were able to pinpoint any waste, 
fraud or abuse in the program, but they were certain that it was there.  The legislature closed its 
special session in April, 1999 with no resolution. 
Governor Sundquist kept the issue alive and pushed for tax reform again in a 2000 
special session and in a 2001 special session.  Anti-tax advocates were prepared.  In a 2001 effort 
led by Rep. Marcia Blackburn (R-Brentwood) and local talk radio hosts Steve Gill and Phil 
Valentine, massive demonstrations against an income tax reminded the General Assembly daily 
that many opposed the tax.  On the night of the final vote, Blackburn sent a frantic fax from the 
floor of the General Assembly to Steve Gill demanding “Send Troops!”109  And what many 
journalists called “an angry mob,” that challenged police and broke a window or two, answered 
the call.  Lawmakers rejected tax reform again.  Though Sundquist vetoed their budget, the 
General Assembly overrode his veto. 
When Governor Sundquist released his budget for fiscal year 2002-2003, it contained 
some severe cuts in some areas, but the overall level of spending increased.  Governor 
Sundquist’s budget required an increase in tax revenues.  State House Democrats released a “no 
new taxes” budget proposal in February.  According to a Tennessean report, they called it the 
“Downsizing Ongoing Government” plan, but it was affectionately known as the DOG.  Critics 
who wished to reform taxes said the budget would "slash existing education funding, drop 
300,000 people from state-subsidized health care, cut most state agencies by 10%, and eliminate 
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 the Departments of Tourism and Economic Development.”110  Critics who wanted no new taxes 
said the proposed program cuts were meant to scare lawmakers into raising taxes. 
Alternate budget plans abounded, with all submitted characterized by their sponsors as 
budgets that would maintain necessary services at the least cost to the taxpayer.  Legislators 
argued mightily, tax protestors led horn-honking displays opposite the state capital, and nothing 
passed.  Tax reform supporters soon took over the prime Charlotte Avenue sidewalk space across 
from the capital, maintaining a 24-hour presence with signs of support for tax reform. 
In June of 2002, House Speaker Jimmy Naifeh submitted a new income tax plan that he 
claimed would leave 65% of the state's taxpayers contributing less to the state coffers than they 
do under the current plan.  Generally speaking, this 65% was on the low end of the income scale.  
The debate rapidly grew even uglier, and legislators could not agree.  The Senate agreed to adopt 
a limited (1%) income tax as a stopgap measure until a statewide referendum on the income tax 
could be taken.  If the referendum approved the income tax, it would rise to 3%.  If the 
referendum denied the income tax, it would be replaced with a sales tax increase.  The House 
would not budge.  When there was no budget by the June 30, 2002 deadline, legislators allowed 
the state government to shut down for the first time in its history.  Non-essential state workers 
stayed home for a week while legislators battled over various proposals. 
During the shutdown, Governor Sundquist proposed a plan similar to the one the Senate 
had passed, but he was ignored.  His own party (the Republican Party) had completely broken 
with the Governor over the issue, and they criticized him harshly and constantly.  The 
Democratic Party, which controlled both state Houses, was split over the issue, with many 
fearing they would lose their seats if they supported even a temporary, limited tax.  Jimmy 
Naifeh simply could not amass the necessary votes.  The tax reformers blinked first, and, just 
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 before the July 4th holiday, legislators agreed to a 1% state sales tax increase.  State government 
reopened on July 5th. 
The income tax issue still would not die.  As Governor Sundquist's second term drew to a 
close, the battle for the Governor's mansion began to take shape.  Republican nominee Van 
Hilleary made opposition to a state income tax the basis of his campaign.  He promised there 
would never be an income tax on his watch, and he mocked Democratic nominee Phil Bredesen 
for refusing to make the same definitive promise.  Former Nashville Mayor Bredesen would only 
say that Tennessee did not need an income tax now, but that he refused to close off any options 
for the future.  He promised he would not support an income tax in his first term, and he would 
not support it in his second term unless he openly advocated an income tax plan in his re-election 
campaign.  Phil Bredesen won a tight race against Congressman Hilleary, and the income tax 
issue, indeed the entire issue of reform in the tax system, was dead until at least 2006. 
Governor Bredesen went on to enact policies similar to those in the DOG budget, cutting 
9% from state government across the board and disenrolling about 300,000 people from 
TennCare.  His argument has been clear: no tax exhibits the kind of revenue growth necessary to 
keep up with health care expenses, and other state services, namely kindergarten through twelfth 
grade education, are suffering from the squeeze created by TennCare spending.  In true “Nixon 
Goes to China” fashion, Governor Bredesen appears to have gotten away with the cuts in a way 
that no Republican likely could have.  As Governor Bredesen’s re-election campaign has geared 
up, he has made it clear that he sees no need for tax reform, so the issue is likely dead for the 
near future.  But Tennessee’s tax system deficiencies persist, and the tax reform issue will almost 
certainly rise again. 
 
 66
 Tennessee’s Current Tax Structure 
 
Tennessee relies on the general sales tax for over half of its tax revenue (60%).  Franchise 
and excise taxes supply 12% of tax revenue, and gasoline taxes make up 8% of total state tax 
revenue.  Additional revenue sources include taxes on gross receipts and privileges (5%), 
insurance and banking (4%), income and inheritance (2%), motor vehicles (2%), and tobacco, 
beer and alcoholic beverages (2%).  The remaining 5% of state tax revenue comes from a variety 
of sources.111  For a few years during the worst of tax fights,  years, the largest portion of this 
category was legal settlements related to health care cost lawsuits brought by the states against 
tobacco companies.  Thos funds have now largely been used. 
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FIGURE 2: Sources of Tennessee State Tax Revenue 
 
 Leaving federal funds aside, Tennessee was ranked 50th in the nation in per capita tax 
revenue in fiscal year 1999 at $3082.62, or 73% of the national average.112  Tennessee’s rank in 
per capita expenditures in 1999 was a bit higher at 48th, representing a per capita expenditure of 
$2,897.76, or 79% of the national average.  At 24.95% of state revenue (including federal funds), 
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 Tennessee’s dependence on sales taxes ranks third in the nation behind Florida (28.21%) and 
Washington (25.24%).113  
 Tennessee has a low corporate tax burden compared to other states. A Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue study indicates that Tennessee’s tax burden on manufacturing firms is 
far lower than the average of the nineteen states compared in the study.  The study, which 
compared tax burdens on hypothetical firms for Tennessee and eighteen other states, showed that 
the average total local and state tax burden on manufacturing firms in Tennessee is 73.8% of the 
study average for all seven hypothetical corporations.  Tennessee’s manufacturing firms had 
higher than average franchise and corporate income tax burdens, but lower than average sales 
and property tax burdens.  Findings reported by the Tennessee Board for Economic Growth 
support those of the Wisconsin study.  These findings report that Tennessee’s corporate tax 
burden, calculated as the excise, franchise, and sales tax liability for an average manufacturer, is 
the third lowest in the region.114 
 The state and local tax burden on non-manufacturing firms in Tennessee is close to that 
of other states in the region.  A 1994 study by the Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana 
demonstrated that the tax burden on non-manufacturing firms in Tennessee represents a larger 
percentage of the regional average than does the burden on manufacturing firms.  Among the 
eleven southern states discussed in the study, Tennessee’s corporate tax burden was lower than 
the average on wholesale firms (95%), but higher than the average on construction (111%) and 
retail firms (113%).  Non-manufacturing firms in Tennessee experienced greater burdens than 
                                                          
113 Rochelle, Robert, 1999, p. 10. 
114 Green & Lippard, 1988, p. v. 
 68
 manufacturing firms for sales and corporate income taxes.  Likewise, incorporated businesses 
carry a greater tax burden than do unincorporated businesses and limited liability companies.115 
 Tennessee has one of the lowest marginal tax rates in the nation.  Zsolt Becsi of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta reports that Tennessee has an 8.64% marginal tax burden, the  
lowest in the nation between 1977 and 1992.  Becsi defined marginal tax rates as the additional 
taxes paid resulting from a small change in personal income.116 
 
 
Does Tennessee Need Tax Reform? 
 
 
                                                          
Revenue stability is a standard goal for good tax systems, and Tennessee’s tax system 
does not produce revenue stability.  The heavy reliance of the Tennessee tax structure on sales 
taxes makes Tennessee’s tax revenue more vulnerable to recession and less responsive to growth 
than other, more balanced systems.  States that succeed with this type of tax system tend to have 
a large portion of their tax revenues coming from tourism or from natural resources.  Florida and 
Nevada depend heavily on tourism.  Texas and Alaska benefit from taxes on oil.  Tennessee has 
something of a tourist industry, but tourist traffic fluctuates widely as the popularity of country 
music waxes and wanes.  Tennessee’s tourism industry cannot be depended upon to produce a 
steady stream of tax revenue. 
Tax reform need not include tax increases.  Tennessee could benefit from lower tax rates 
over a broader tax base.  By reforming business taxation, adding an income tax, and/or taxing 
services(to name a few of the proposals that have been made), Tennessee can broaden its tax 
base and create a more stable revenue system. 
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 TABLE 1: Tennessee Tax Revenue and Tax Base Information117 
Item Tax Base and Rate 
Amount (in 
thousands) Per Capita
Percent of 
Tax Revenue
Sales and gross receipts    6,061,656 1,054.31 75.36%
    General sales and gross receipts 7% on final retail sales; 6% on grocery food; many services exempt 4,704,130 818.20 58.48%
    Selective sales taxes   1,357,526 236.12 16.88%
        Alcoholic beverages 
Wholesalers pay $4.40/ gallon on distilled liquor, $1.21/ gallon on 
wine, 15¢ per case enforcement tax on liquor and wine, $4.29/ barrel 
of beer, and 17% on the wholesale price of beer.  15% of gross receipts 
on alcoholic beverage sales at liquor by the drink establishments. 78,471 13.65 0.98%
        Insurance premiums 
.7% on life premiums, 1% on accident and health premiums, 1.3% on 
property and casualty premiums. 296,496 51.57 3.69%
        Motor fuels 
20¢ per gallon on regular (unleaded) gasoline, 17¢ per gallon on 
diesel, 13¢ per gallon on natural gas used in motor vehicles, 14¢ per 
gallon on liquefied petroleum gas, and 1¢ per gallon inspection fee on 
all fuels.  Aircraft fuel is exempt, but subject to the regular sales tax. 774,689 134.74 9.63%
        Pari-mutuels 
Wagering tax (range 2% - 4%), .5% racing development tax on 
wagers, 15¢ admission tax, 67% tax on “breakage” and unclaimed 
prizes.  Pari-mutuels failed their 1987 ballot test and are not legal. X X X
        Public utilities 
Credit for franchise and excise taxes paid.  Gas cos pay 1.5% on gross 
receipts over $5,000, water and electric cos pay 3% on gross revenues 
over $5,000, and all others (excluding telecom, which is subject to the 
sales tax with telemarketing exemptions) pay 3% on gross receipts. 3,998 0.70 0.05%
        Tobacco products 1¢/cigarette and 6.6% of  wholesale on other tobacco products 81,671 14.21 1.02%
        Other selective sales 
 
Includes consignments, flea market booths, some services, etc. 122,201 21.25 1.52%
Licenses  878,136 152.74 10.92%
    Alcoholic beverages 
Paid by manufacturers, distilleries, wineries, wholesalers, retail stores 
and liquor by the drink establishments (range $400-1000) 2,275 0.40 0.03%
    Amusement  $100 per coin-operated machine, “flipper” machines excluded 58 0.01 0.00%
    Corporation franchise .25% on the higher of net worth or book value 480,242 83.53 5.97%
    Hunting and fishing  $8 - $136 for residents, $9 - $401 for non-residents. 24,782 4.31 0.31%
    Motor vehicle  $13.50/motorcycle, $20.50/passenger car, trucks by weight ($20-1333) 225,933 39.30 2.81%
    Motor vehicle operators  $19.50 per five-year license 37,268 6.48 0.46%
    Public utility  .3% on gross rcpts $5000-$1 million, .2% on amounts over $1 million. 6,236 1.08 0.08%
    Occupation and business, NEC 
65% of the gross receipts from all retail and wholesale sales; rates vary 
by merchandise class from 1/60 of 1% to 1/8 of 1%. 96,821 16.84 1.20%
    Other 
Includes professional ($200), marriage ($15), vending machine ($2 per 
company plus $1 per machine), etc. 4,521 0.79 0.06%
Other taxes  1,103,555 191.94 13.72%
    Individual income (Hall Inc. Tax) 6% of interest and stock/ bond dividends with $1250 exempt per payer 198,071 34.45 2.46%
    Corporation net income 
6.5% on federal taxable income with some adjustments - main 
adjustment is apportionment, figured as [TN property/Total property + 
TN payroll/Total payroll + 2(TN receipts/ Total receipts)].  LLC’s and 
LLP’s must refigure federal amount. 673,465 117.14 8.37%
    Inheritance and gift 
Gift: Exempt $10,000 for family or $5000 for other.  On taxable 
portion for families (in thousands): $0 - $40 (5.5%), 40 - $240 (6.5%), 
$240 - $440 (7.5%), $440 and above (9.5%)  On taxable portion for 
non-family (in thousands): $0 - $50 (6.5%), $40 - $100 (9.5%), $100 - 
$150 (12%), $150 - $250 (13.5%), $250 and up (16%).  Inheritance: 
Exempt $1,000,000.  Rates on remaining portion match the rates on 
gifts to families above. 84,140 14.63 1.05%
    Documentary and stock transfer .37% on value.  If related to debt, .115% on value over $2000. 117,780 20.49 1.46%
    Severance 20¢ per ton on coal, and 3% of the sale price on oil and gas. 1,131 0.20 0.01%
    Other 
Includes investment cos (2% gross profits), Industrial loan /thrifts (.2% 
on gross receipts, min. $300, max. $1000), Production credit assns 
(3.75% on net receipts), Tire disp. ($1 per tire), Bail bonds ($12), etc. 28,968 5.04 0.36%
                                                          
117 Revenues: United States Census Bureau, 2001.  Rate and Tax Base: Forrister & Buechler, 2003. 
 70
  In recent years, Tennessee’s budgets have relied on an influx of cash from legal 
settlements with tobacco companies.  These settlements have now been spent, and Tennessee’s 
failure to reform its tax system caused the state’s bond rating to drop from AAA to AA after the 
passage of the 2001-2002 budget.  Tennessee had revenue troubles while the nation was 
experiencing explosive growth; though the economic recession leveled the field a bit, as 
Tennessee’s sluggish revenue system is also stable in the face of slow or negative growth. 
 The state has managed to limp along as a low-service, low-tax state without tax reform, 
but increases in the sales tax were required to fund even the modest levels of education and 
social programs that are required by federal law.  Since the passage of a sales tax increase to 
fund the 2002-2003 budget, Tennessee’s sales tax level is now the highest in the nation (when 
state and county/local option levels are combined), and, as sales tax rates begin to rival shipping 
charges, Tennessee will find it more and more difficult to compete with catalog and internet 
companies for retail business. 
 Included in the bill that raised the sales tax was the requirement that the state set up a 
commission to study the Tennessee tax system and make recommendations for reform.  The 
Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission (“Commission”) issued its final report in December, 
2004, in which it concluded that: 118 
• the current tax structure is anti-competitive; 
• the Tennessee sales tax rate is too high; 
• the sales tax base is eroding; 
• the current structure lacks balance and stability; 
• the current structure is inelastic; 
                                                          
118Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission, 2004, pp. 8-9. 
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 • the current tax structure is too regressive; 
• the business franchise tax discourages capital investment and expansion in Tennessee; 
and 
• the narrow tax base yields high tax rates. 
These conclusions are similar to those in this analysis. 
 The Commission made several recommendations for changes to the state’s tax 
structure.119  Those recommendations are listed below. 
1. Reduce the general state sales tax rate to 6%, and eliminate the general local option sales 
tax.  This would reduce the overall general state and local sales tax rate from a maximum 
of 9.75% to 6%. 
2. Reduce the state sales tax rate on grocery food to 4%, and eliminate the local option sales 
tax on grocery food.  This would reduce the overall state and local sales tax rate on 
grocery food from a maximum of 8.75% to 4%. 
3. Repeal the Hall income tax. 
4. Eliminate the property basis of the business franchise tax, and reduce the rate by 50% to 
$0.125 per $100 of assessed value. 
5. Implement a local “hold harmless” provision such that local governments are not harmed 
by the recommended changes. 
6. In fairness to taxpayers, introduce an independent review of all tax appeals, and eliminate 
pay-to-play requirements for tax appeals. 
7. Limit state tax growth. 
These recommendations, if enacted, were expected to reduce revenue by more than $3 billion.  
                                                          
119 Ibid, p. 10. 
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 The Commission considered several different types of taxes to make up the revenue loss, 
as its members had agreed early in the process to produce revenue-neutral recommendations.  
These included the enactment of numerous modified consumption taxes, a pure value added tax, 
a single-rate exchange tax, a health care provider tax, a business entity tax, an intangible property 
tax, a wealth equity tax, gas tax increases, a single-rate sales tax, a dramatically broadened sales 
tax on services, a personal income tax, a state ad valorem tax on registered motor vehicles, and a 
statewide real property tax.120 
 The Commission invited presentations on these tax options, and, after consideration of 
what these experts considered important simplicity and competitiveness constraints, presented 
two comprehensive options to recover the lost revenue.121  Both of the proposals were estimated 
to recover the full $3 billion in revenue required for a revenue-neutral structural reform. 
 The first option proposed a broad-based personal income tax with a graduated rate 
ranging from 3.5% to 6%, exemptions from $15,000 to $30,000, a $2,000 deduction per 
dependent, and a credit against the professional privilege tax for the amount of income tax paid. 
 The second option proposed the enactment of a statewide personal property tax on 
motorized, registered items (like boats, automobiles, motorcycles, airplanes, etc.) with an 
average assessment of $100 per item, and a statewide real property tax at a rate of $2.60 per $100 
of taxable value. 
 These two proposed tax packages form the basis of further analysis in this paper using a 
portfolio model to evaluate revenue stability versus revenue growth.
                                                          
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 I examine Tennessee’s tax system using a portfolio model as described earlier in this 
paper.  The model used is the basic White model and is designed to map a function of tax 
systems that optimize growth and stability, while recognizing that the two operate in a “trade-
off” relationship.  Tennessee’s current system is compared to the two tax reform packages 
proposed by the Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission (“Commission”), as well as to an 
optimal frontier of tax packages that minimize instability while growing at least as fast as the 
state economy.  While the Commission proposed two tax mixes with particular rates for each 
type of tax, the rates of the types of taxes they proposed are allowed to vary in the creation of the 
optimal frontier by allowing the revenue each type of tax generates to vary. 
 
 
Taxes Currently in Use 
 
 For the current system, actual tax revenue data are used for the period of 1992 to 2001. 
This data is as reported by the United States Census Bureau.  Growth is measured as the average 
annual percentage change in tax revenue above expected tax revenue for each type of tax over 
those ten years.  Expected tax revenue is defined as revenue that grew at the same rate as gross 
state product (“GSP”).  Legislated changes are noted where appropriate, but they are not taken 
into account in the growth section.  No legislated changes took place in the major tax areas 
during the period under study; few took place among the smaller tax types.  Instability is 
measured as the variance around expected revenue. 
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  The major taxes that are included in the analysis are discussed below.  The smaller taxes, 
licenses and fees are included, but they are not discussed in detail. 
 
General Sales and Gross Receipts 
This tax is currently levied at 7% on non-grocery food items and at 6% on grocery food 
items.  There is also a local option sales tax that is not levied at the state level and thus is not 
included in the analysis.  One of the recommendations made by the Commission, however, was 
to remove the local option sales tax and replace that revenue at the state level.  Since the 
Commission’s recommendations are taken as a starting point for the optimal tax frontier analysis, 
that revenue is required to be replaced in the tax packages based on the Commission 
recommendations.  The sales tax was 6% on all items during almost all of the years being 
analyzed, so that is how it is counted when examining the current system (and the local option 
revenue is not expected to be generated by the state under the current system, as it is not so 
generated now).  The state tax rate changed from 5.5% to 6% in May of 1992.  In order to make 
1992 comparable to the other years in the analysis, an estimate of ten months of revenue (figured 
as 5/6 of the full fiscal year revenue) was divided by the 5.5% rate to get the tax base, then 
multiplied by 6% to estimate revenue if the rate had been 6% for the entire fiscal year. 
In the portfolio analysis, grocery food and other taxable items are separated, but their 
growth and instability values are the same.  This is a result of the fact that the two had to be 
estimated using just two years of data.  The two categories have been separately taxed since after 
the beginning of the fiscal year in 2003.  This mid-year rate change made the 2003 fiscal year 
unusable for estimation purposes.  In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, grocery purchases made up 
8.45% of total taxable purchases, so this is the percentage used to estimate the two separate 
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 revenue categories for the purpose of this analysis.  This steady percentage assignment of 
revenues to each category produced three categories with the same growth rates and variance 
measures, but with different levels of revenue. 
 
Corporation Franchise Tax 
 This tax is currently levied at 0.25% on the higher of a) net worth or b) depreciated value 
of real and tangible property.  The Commission recommended removing the latter as one of the 
options and cutting the rate in half.  This would make the tax just 0.125% on net worth.  Actual 
revenues are used over the 1992 - 2001 time period for the evaluation of the current system, but 
the tax base changes to the new definition for the evaluation of the two Commission proposals. 
 The tax base with the property basis removed was provided by the Tennessee Department 
of Revenue.  In order to determine tax liability, the Department of Revenue has both net worth 
and property value numbers on record.  The department provided the revenue that would have 
been raised if only net worth was used to determine tax liability, and it added back the corporate 
net income tax credits that would have been lost due to lower tax liabilities for those businesses 
that were actually taxed at the higher property value rates.  The Department of Revenue provided 
this data for the years 1999 through 2003.  Actual data were used for 1999 through 2001, while 
the average annual growth rate over the five years provided was used to estimate the revenues for 
1992 through 1998. 
 
Corporation Net Income Tax 
 This tax is currently levied at 6.5% of apportioned federal taxable income with some 
adjustments for state apportionment and for LLC’s and LLP’s.  Actual revenues are used in 
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 analyzing the current system and the two Commission-proposed systems, which did not alter this 
tax. 
Hall Income Tax 
 
 The Hall income tax is currently levied at 6% of bond interest and stock dividends after a 
$1,250 exemption per payer.  Actual revenues for the 1992 to 2001 period are used in the 
analysis.  Since the Commission recommended removing this tax from the system, it is not 
included in the analyses of either of the tax packages based on Commission recommendations.  
This does not require an increase in the total revenue required, however, because Hall income tax 
revenue is already counted in state tax revenue. 
 
 
Taxes Not Currently in Use 
 
 For the taxes not currently in use (the personal income tax, the motor vehicle tax and the 
state real property tax), revenue is estimated for each of the ten years under analysis by 
estimating the tax base and applying the proper rate.  In the case of the optimal tax frontier 
analysis, revenues are allowed to vary. 
 
Motor Vehicle Tax 
The Commission defined the motor vehicle tax as one on all motorized, registered 
vehicles, which include cars, light trucks, motorcycles, boats and airplanes.  It is not clear 
whether the Commission intended to include what the federal Department of Transportation calls 
“truck tractors”, which generally haul tractor trailers and are registered in multiple states.  For 
those registered in many states, tax payments are split among those states based on annual 
mileage driven in each.  Owners of these trucks would be unlikely to stand for a property tax, but 
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 would label a state other than Tennessee as their state of residence to avoid it.  A similar problem 
exists with airplanes. 
For cars, trucks and motorcycles, the federal Department of Transportation report of 
numbers of registered vehicles is used, and the truck tractor number is subtracted from the total.  
The number of registered boats is added in as reported by the Tennessee Wildlife Commission, 
which registers all Tennessee boats.  The Wildlife Commission provided full data for the years 
2000 and 2001.  Actual data were used for those years, while the growth rate between the two 
years was used to estimate the number of boats registered for 1992 through 2000. 
The Federal Aviation Administration kept records of general aircraft registered by state 
through 1993.  Actual data for 1992 and 1993 are used, as reported in the Tennessee Statistical 
Abstract.  The Federal Aviation Administration can still provide the current number of registered 
general aircraft, so that number is used, with the 1992-1993 data, to find an average annual 
growth rate and estimate the numbers for 1994 to 2001.  
The Commission specified that this tax would be levied such that the average payment 
would be $100.  Revenue, then, is estimated as $100 times the number of qualified registered 
vehicles.  In the optimization model, revenue is allowed to fluctuate. 
 
Income Tax 
For the income tax, the representative income groups created by the Commission in its 
equity analysis are used as the tax base.  The data used to create this are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Surveys and from the United States Census Bureau’s 
Current Population Surveys from 2000 to 2002 and represent 2001 in the analysis.  Income is 
reduced for each representative group by the rate of change of wages in Tennessee over the nine 
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 years previous to 2001, as reported in the United States Statistical Abstract by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  When figuring revenue from the different tax proposals, the “representative 
income” for each bracket (determined by the Commission) represents that bracket.  When, for 
instance, the bracket runs from $10,000 to $17,999 and is represented by $14,854, no one in the 
bracket is assumed to pay any income tax when the exemption is $15,000.  The representative 
income for the bracket falls below the $15,000 level, so all members of the bracket are counted 
as below the exemption.  This duplicates the process used by the Commission in its equity and 
revenue analyses. 
Though the Commission recommended a progressive-rate system, the analysis includes a 
flat-rate possibility, as even a flat-rate income tax is considered to be more progressive than the 
major revenue generator for the state, the sales tax.  The flat-rate tax revenue estimates are based 
on a $10,000 exemption for single households, a $15,000 exemption for single heads of 
household, and a $20,000 exemption for married households.  The rate is set at 4%.  This largely 
mirrors the flat tax proposal made by Governor Ned McWherter in his second term.  The 
exemption is somewhat higher, partly to reflect inflation since then, and partly for simplicity. 
 
State Real Property Tax 
 The state does not currently have a statewide real property tax, though such a tax is the 
main source of funds for most local governments.  The tax base, property assessments, are as 
reported by the Tennessee Comptroller of the Treasury.  The rate recommended by the 
Commission was $2.60 per $100 of taxable value, and this is the rate used to estimate revenue 
for the 1992 to 2001 period.  In the portfolio analysis, revenue is allowed to vary.  Equalized 
assessments are used to make all taxable values comparable. 
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 Constraints 
 
 Throughout the literature, while optimizing growth and stability, constraints are imposed 
on optimal tax systems. 
 
Equity 
 Equity was considered by the Commission in the process of building the reform tax 
package proposals.  The Commission included an extensive equity analysis in its final report,122 
and the results of that analysis were used in determining which types of taxes made it into its 
final proposal.  That analysis serves as an excellent equity constraint by allowing only those tax 
types that were considered equitable by this Commission, the makeup of which was designed to 
fairly represent Tennessee’s citizenry fairly.123 
 Only those taxes that the Commission proposed adding or continuing are used in the 
models based on Commission tax packages.  Other tax packages are also analyzed, and the 
extent to which they part from Commission equity concerns are discussed in the policy 
recommendation section. 
 
Efficiency 
 Efficiency is very difficult to measure, as deadweight social losses can only be 
determined with current, detailed information on all markets affected by a tax.  Since such 
information is not available, efficiency can only be estimated using the guiding principles 
derived from optimal taxation theory.  Discussions of these principles and their applications to 
Tennessee tax policy are included in the policy recommendation section of the paper. 
                                                          
122 Ibid, pp. 62–89. 
123 Tennessee Public Acts, 2002. Chapter No. 856, Section 12. 
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 Competitiveness 
 Gentry and Ladd include a “competitiveness” variable in their analysis to address some 
elements of efficiency.  This variable compares the state tax rate to the national mean for each 
type of tax.  Competitiveness was one of the criteria used by the Commission in its choice of tax 
types, with special concern shown about the types and rates of taxes compared to neighboring 
states and the chilling effect that some business taxes might have on investment in Tennessee.124  
This constraint was used to narrow the list of proposed reform taxes, and, again, the Commission 
is in the best position to define competitiveness for Tennessee.  The extent to which any taxes 
emerging from the analysis fail to meet the competitiveness standards set by the Commission are 
discussed in the policy recommendation section of the paper. 
 
Simplicity 
 Simplicity is also difficult to measure.  While it is theoretically possible to estimate 
compliance time and value that time using an average or median wage, the exercise is unlikely to 
produce anything that a general policy discussion would not.  As compliance time would have to 
be estimated, general principles would likely dominate such an analysis.  This topic is further 
discussed in the policy proposal section of the paper. 
 
Sufficiency 
 Sufficiency is determined by setting total revenue at the 2001 level.  This analysis is not 
meant to judge revenue levels, but to examine the best way of raising a given level of revenue. 
 
                                                          
124 Final Report of the Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission, 2004, pp. 10, 34. 
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 Data Analysis 
 
All data analyses are performed using Excel and SAS; the program language used for the 
optimization in SAS is attached in the Appendix.
 82
 CHAPTER V 
 
MODEL 
 
 The model used in this portfolio analysis is the basic White model, which minimizes the 
variance of the tax system as a whole, subject to total revenue and individual revenue constraints.  
The model is described by the following equations: 
Minimize σ2T 
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λ is a scalar . 
Covariance is: 
 
ijσ = ijρ iσ                  (15) jσ
 
where: 
 
1
1
ˆ 2
−
∑
=
−
= 








•
m
m
t R
RR
σ
i
itit
i
                                (16) 
 83
 Rit is the revenue from the ith tax in year t 
itRˆ
ijρ
 is the expected revenue from the ith tax in year t, if revenue grows at the same rate as GSP 
 is the correlation coefficient between the ith tax and the jth tax and 
•iR  is mean revenue for t = 1 to m. 
 The constraints incorporated in the model are of the following form and meaning.  First 
the sum of the individual tax revenues must equal the desired aggregate level of tax revenue, 
assumed to be the state’s 2001 level in this case. 
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(17) 
 
Second, the level of revenue from each individual tax must be either zero or positive, which is 
commonly referred to as the non-negativity constraint. 
 
Ri ≥ 0 (for all i, i = 1 to n)              (18) 
 
Third, maximum upper limits are placed on the level of revenue that can be generated from each 
individual tax. 
 
Ri ≤ Li (for all i, i = 1 to n)              (19) 
 
In the optimization problems, the revenue from each tax is allowed to vary to plus or minus 
100% of its 2001 revenue. 
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  The summation term in equation (13) is the overall variance, and the summation term in 
equation (14) is the overall growth rate.  Parameterizing λ from 0 to infinity produces a sequence 
of solutions of increasing overall growth rate and overall variance of tax revenue.  In the 
optimization problem, points chosen for lambda represented overall growth rates at 1% intervals 
from 0% to 12%.  Negative overall growth rates were not considered; points were chosen 
between 0% growth and 12%, as that is the point at which enough revenue could be generated by 
the highest-growth taxes to make a solution possible. 
 The model is run using six different sets of possible taxes, including the current system, 
the two systems proposed by the Commission, a few variations on those, and a set of all of the 
major taxes from all of the systems. 
The first is the set of current taxes, including the general sales and use tax, the corporate 
franchise and excise taxes in their current forms, the Hall income tax, and the many selective 
sales taxes and fees that make up the rest of the system.  The few taxes and fees that fell into 
“other” revenue categories were left out.  Revenue generated by this tax system represented 
98.06% of total actual revenue in 2001, and provided the target revenue for all systems expected 
to raise 2001’s total revenue. 
The Commission’s first proposal includes separate sales taxes for grocery food and all 
other taxable sales, the corporate franchise tax with the property base removed, the 
Commission’s proposed progressive income tax (but no Hall income tax), and the many selective 
sales taxes and fees that make up the rest of the system.  In addition, the Commission’s proposal 
that the local sales tax be removed and replaced by state revenue makes the total required 
revenue higher.  In 2001, local sales tax revenues totaled $1,448,653,767 (as reported by the 
Tennessee Department of Revenue).  Following that formula, the tax systems based on 
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 Commission proposals are expected to raise an additional  $122,411,243 in total revenue to make 
up for the local revenue losses. 
The Commission’s second proposal includes separate sales taxes for grocery food and all 
other taxable sales, the corporate franchise tax with the property base removed, the 
Commission’s proposed motor vehicle tax, the Commission’s proposed state real property tax, 
no Hall income tax, and the many selective sales taxes and fees that make up the rest of the 
system.  In addition, the Commission’s proposal that the local sales tax on food also be removed 
and replaced by state revenue makes the total required revenue increase by $1,348,653,767.  
 Both the current tax system and the Commission’s first proposal are evaluated with the 
addition of a flat income tax (or a substitution for the progressive income tax in the Commission 
proposal’s case).  Total revenue required is the same for the current system as it is without the 
income tax, and it is the same for the Commission proposal as it is with the progressive income 
tax. 
All of the major taxes from all of the systems are included in one analysis that is expected 
to raise the same amount of revenue as the current tax system.
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 CHAPTER VI 
 
 
RESULTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Static Models 
 
 
                                                          
The first step of the analysis is to look at three static tax systems, including the state’s 
current system and the two systems proposed by the Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission 
(“Commission”).  Table 2 shows the current tax system.  The overall average annual growth rate 
of the system was 8.34% over the 1992 - 2001 time period.  During the same time period, Gross 
State Product (GSP) grew at an average annual rate of 6.87%.125  It is true that the time period 
under consideration began during an economic recession, proceeded through an economic boom, 
and ended just before another economic recession, but these phenomena also affect GSP.  
Tennessee’s tax system performed better than many of its critics suggest.  Nonetheless, 
Tennessee did suffer revenue shortages in the late 1990’s, when income was growing rapidly.126 
 The fastest growing tax in the system was the corporation net income tax, which 
sometimes showed revenue increases of over 20% in a single year.  It was also one of the most 
volatile taxes in the system, with a coefficient of variation of 23.51%.  Not surprisingly, 
inheritance and gift tax revenues showed the most variation, with a coefficient of variation of 
34.72%.  With an average annual growth rate of 8.21%, the sales tax was not among the slowest 
growth taxes, but it also failed to show the level of stability it is sometimes credited with having. 
125United States Bureau of Economic Analysis 
126 This analysis does not consider population changes, and tennessee’s population did increase over the time period 
analyzed.  An analysis of per capita revenues would not change the relationships of the revenue amounts to one 
another, as dividing all of the amounts in the optimization problems by a constant would not change the  
comparative results.  Nonetheless, a per capita analysis might show Tennessee’s sales tax revenue growing at a 
slower pace, more closely matching expectations. 
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TABLE 2:  Tennessee’s Current Tax System 
Current System Tax 
Type 
2001 
Revenues 
Average 
Annual Growth 
Rate 
Coefficient of 
Variation of 
1992 to 2001 
Revenue 
System 
Growth 
Total Revenue $7,887,599,000      
Sales/Gross 
Receipts $4,704,130,000 8.21% 18.37% 4.90%
Corporation 
Franchise $480,242,000 12.01% 29.99% 0.73%
Motor Vehicle 
Licensing Fee $225,933,000 4.71% 12.31% 0.13%
Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 14.23% 23.51% 1.22%
Hall Income $198,071,000 12.46% 29.12% 0.31%
Alcoholic Beverage 
Tax $78,471,000 2.68% 7.77% 0.03%
Insurance Premium 
Tax $296,496,000 10.12% 22.87% 0.38%
Motor Fuels Tax $774,689,000 2.00% 6.90% 0.20%
Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 -3.16% 13.78% 0.00%
Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 0.22% 2.93% 0.00%
Alcoholic Beverage 
License Fee $2,275,000 4.43% 16.02% 0.00%
Hunting & Fishing 
License Fee $24,782,000 2.42% 12.93% 0.01%
Motor Vehicle 
Operators License 
Fee $37,268,000 4.16% 10.72% 0.02%
Public Utility 
License Fee $6,236,000 5.87% 19.04% 0.00%
Occupation and 
Business License 
Fee $96,821,000 7.96% 17.90% 0.10%
Inheritance and Gift 
Tax $84,140,000 10.93% 34.72% 0.12%
Documentary and 
Stock Transfer Tax $117,780,000 13.03% 27.05% 0.19%
Severance Tax $1,131,000 -0.63% 12.74% 0.00%
          
          
System Variance 4.28817E+17   
System 
Growth 8.34%
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 TABLE 3: Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission Proposal One 
Commission Proposal One 
Tax Type 2001 Revenues 
Average 
Annual Growth 
Rate 
Coefficient of 
Variation of 
1992 to 2001 
Revenue 
System 
Growth 
Total Revenue $15,009,757,718      
Estimated Grocery Food $264,999,323 8.21% 18.37% 0.14%
Estimated Non-Grocery Food 
and Non-Food $4,306,631,015 8.21% 18.37% 2.36%
Estimated Corporation 
Franchise - Property Basis 
Removed $196,052,950 4.57% 15.45% 0.06%
Actual Motor Vehicle 
Licensing Fee $225,933,000 4.71% 12.31% 0.07%
Actual Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 14.23% 23.51% 0.64%
Estimated Commission 
Income Tax Proposal $7,736,918,430 11.02% 24.05% 5.68%
Actual Alcoholic Beverage 
Tax $78,471,000 2.68% 7.77% 0.01%
Actual Insurance Premium 
Tax $296,496,000 10.12% 22.87% 0.20%
Actual Motor Fuels Tax $774,689,000 2.00% 6.90% 0.10%
Actual Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 -3.16% 13.78% 0.00%
Actual Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 0.22% 2.93% 0.00%
Actual Alcoholic Beverage 
License Fee $2,275,000 4.43% 16.02% 0.00%
Actual Hunting & Fishing 
License Fee $24,782,000 2.42% 12.93% 0.00%
Actual Motor Vehicle 
Operators License Fee $37,268,000 4.16% 10.72% 0.01%
Actual Public Utility License 
Fee $6,236,000 5.87% 19.04% 0.00%
Actual Occupation and 
Business License Fee $96,821,000 7.96% 17.90% 0.05%
Actual Inheritance and Gift 
Tax $84,140,000 10.93% 34.72% 0.06%
Actual Documentary and 
Stock Transfer Tax $117,780,000 13.03% 27.05% 0.10%
Actual Severance Tax $1,131,000 -0.63% 12.74% 0.00%
          
System Variance 2.30918E+18   
System 
Growth 9.50%
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 With a coefficient of variation of 18.55%, the sales tax certainly demonstrated more volatility 
than expected.  Much of the sales tax revenue’s growth occurred between 1994 and 1995; sales  
tax revenues grew at a much slower pace in the late 1990’s.  The severance tax and public 
utilities tax were the only two to show average revenue declines over the time period.  As a 
group, the license fees were among the slowest-growing but most stable revenue sources. 
 Table 3 shows the Commission’s first proposal, which was projected to raise almost 
twice the revenue as the current system.  Though this system needed to raise additional revenue 
in order to replace the recommended loss of the local option sales tax, it is projected to raise far 
more than necessary to achieve that goal.  Both its growth rate and its system variance are 
somewhat higher than the current system.  A few of the recommended changes are of particular 
interest. 
 The system lost the Hall income tax, which is one of the faster growing and more volatile 
taxes in the current system, but it gained the Commission’s proposed progressive-rate income 
tax.  This tax proves to be an enormous revenue source, far outperforming the non-grocery 
portion of the sales tax, which was recommended to be reduced by 1%.  This tax alone is 
projected to produce almost as much revenue as the whole state system did in 2001.  The 
proposed progressive income tax was estimated to grow at a rapid annual average clip of 
11.02%, though it is also one of the less stable revenue sources, with a coefficient of variation of 
24.05%. 
 Another big change in this system is the corporation franchise tax base and rate.  The 
Commission recommended removing the property basis for the tax, and basing it solely on 
corporate net worth.  The Commission also recommended cutting the rate of the tax in half.  As a 
result, this tax was projected to raise a little over 40% of the revenue it raised in the current 
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 system over the same time period.  Its growth rate fell to just over a third of what it was 
previously, but it also became a much more stable revenue source. 
 Finally, this proposed tax system separates the sales tax on grocery food and non-grocery 
food, cutting the rate on the former to 4% and on the latter to 6%.  Because data were 
unavailable to generate separate growth rates and coefficients of variation on these taxes, the 
effects of such a change are hard to see here.  Nonetheless, there is general agreement that the 
more inelastic demand for grocery food makes the sales tax base more stable, but slower-
growing.  It would likely become a less dependable revenue source with that portion of the base 
taxed at a lower rate.. 
 The results of the Commission’s second proposal are shown in Table 4.  This system also 
cuts the sales tax rates, separates the sales tax bases, and both alters and cuts the rate of the 
corporate franchise tax.  These differences have the same effects as they did in the Commission’s 
first proposal.  The changes here are that the progressive rate income tax has been replaced by a 
motor vehicle tax and a state real property tax.  The motor vehicle tax is a very stable revenue 
source, with a coefficient of variation of only 6.59%, but it also grows very slowly, with an 
average revenue growth rate of only 1.21%.  The motor vehicle tax was based on the 
Commission’s idea that it would be levied at an average of $100 per vehicle.  In truth, it was 
proposed as a tax on property value, and, even if set to average $100 per vehicle, would 
presumably increase with vehicle values over time.  This was impossible to estimate, however, 
so the Commission’s assumptions were used.  The tax would probably exhibit somewhat higher 
growth and variability than estimated.  The state real property tax exhibits a more rapid growth 
rate, with revenues increasing 9.59% annually.  But it is still a rather volatile revenue source for 
its growth rate; the coefficient of variation is 22.68%. 
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TABLE 4: Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission Proposal Two 
Commission Proposal Two 
Tax Type 2001 Revenues 
Average 
Annual Growth 
Rate 
Coefficient of 
Variation of 
1992 to 2001 
Revenue 
System 
Growth 
Total Revenue $10,188,063,582       
Estimated Grocery Food $264,999,323 8.21% 18.37% 0.21%
Estimated Non-Grocery 
Food and Non-Food $4,306,631,015 8.21% 18.37% 3.47%
Estimated Corporation 
Franchise - Property Basis 
Removed $196,052,950 4.57% 15.45% 0.09%
Actual Motor Vehicle 
Licensing Fee $225,933,000 4.71% 12.31% 0.10%
Actual Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 14.23% 23.51% 0.94%
Estimated Motor Vehicle 
Tax $525,607,500 1.21% 6.59% 0.06%
Estimated Real Property 
Tax $2,389,616,794 9.59% 22.68% 2.25%
Actual Alcoholic Beverage 
Tax $78,471,000 2.68% 7.77% 0.02%
Actual Insurance Premium 
Tax $296,496,000 10.12% 22.87% 0.29%
Actual Motor Fuels Tax $774,689,000 2.00% 6.90% 0.15%
Actual Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 -3.16% 13.78% 0.00%
Actual Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 0.22% 2.93% 0.00%
Actual Alcoholic Beverage 
License Fee $2,275,000 4.43% 16.02% 0.00%
Actual Hunting & Fishing 
License Fee $24,782,000 2.42% 12.93% 0.01%
Actual Motor Vehicle 
Operators License Fee $37,268,000 4.16% 10.72% 0.02%
Actual Public Utility 
License Fee $6,236,000 5.87% 19.04% 0.00%
Actual Occupation and 
Business License Fee $96,821,000 7.96% 17.90% 0.08%
Actual Inheritance and Gift 
Tax $84,140,000 10.93% 34.72% 0.09%
Actual Documentary and 
Stock Transfer Tax $117,780,000 13.03% 27.05% 0.15%
Actual Severance Tax $1,131,000 -0.63% 12.74% 0.00%
          
System Variance 5.52368E+17   
System 
Growth 7.94%
 92
  These two new taxes fail to offer the same kind of revenue potential created by the 
progressive-rate income tax in the Commission’s first proposal.  As a whole, this system has a  
slower growth rate than the Commission’s first proposal, but it has a somewhat lower system 
variance as well.  It is important to note, however, that this system has both a lower growth rate 
and a higher variance than the current tax system, making it inferior on both measures and 
unlikely to be recommended. 
 
 
Optimization Results 
 
 The optimization problem was solved for six different tax system scenarios, all of which 
are described in detail earlier in the paper. 
• The current tax system 
• The current tax system with the addition of a flat income tax 
• The Commission’s progressive income tax proposal 
• The Commission’s motor vehicle tax and real property tax proposal 
• The Commission’s income tax proposal with a flat tax in place of the progressive one 
• All of the major taxes in the above proposals 
Since this was a quadratic problem with linear constraints, many taxes do not show up in the 
solutions at all.  This does not mean that those taxes will be recommended to be removed from 
the Tennessee tax mix; this quadratic optimization is used as a guideline as other considerations 
come into play in the policy recommendations. 
 
The Current System 
 The results from the current system’s tax mix are shown in Table 5.  Only the turning 
points are shown.  The solution set was the same for both 0% growth and 1% growth, so 1% is
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 TABLE 5: Current Tax System Optimization Results 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 1.00% 7.00% 8.00% 9.00% 10.00%
Sales/Gross Receipts $4,704,130,000 $9,408,260,000 8.21% $6,612,293,458 $6,371,002,336 $5,742,671,804 $6,183,743,903 $4,830,637,753
Corporation Franchise $480,242,000 $960,484,000 12.01% $0 $474,983,975 $540,717,800 $451,383,418 $960,480,000
Motor Vehicle 
Licensing Fee $225,933,000 $451,866,000 4.71% $451,870,000 $451,870,000 $451,870,000 $0 $0
Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 $1,346,930,000 14.23% $0 $0 $0 $539,913,077 $1,346,900,000
Hall Income $198,071,000 $396,142,000 12.46% $160,930,899 $179,126,108 $0 $175,731,381 $396,140,000
Insurance Premium 
Tax $296,496,000 $592,992,000 10.12% $0 $0 $592,990,000 $336,696,878 $353,442,247
Motor Fuels Tax $774,689,000 $1,549,378,000 2.00% $210,322,908 $0 $51,226,078 $0 $0
Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 $7,996,000 -3.16% $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $6,491,343 $0
Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 $163,342,000 0.22% $107,162,735 $119,711,581 $163,340,000 $0 $0
Alcoholic Beverage 
License Fee $2,275,000 $4,550,000 4.43% $4,550,000 $0 $4,550,000 $0 $0
Hunting & Fishing 
License Fee $24,782,000 $49,564,000 2.42% $49,564,000 $0 $49,328,318 $0 $0
Motor Vehicle 
Operators License Fee $37,268,000 $74,536,000 4.16% $74,536,000 $74,536,000 $74,536,000 $0 $0
Public Utility License 
Fee $6,236,000 $12,472,000 5.87% $12,472,000 $12,472,000 $12,472,000 $0 $0
Occupation and 
Business License Fee $96,821,000 $193,642,000 7.96% $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $0
Severance Tax $1,131,000 $2,262,000 -0.63% $2,262,000 $2,262,000 $2,262,000 $0 $0
Minimized Variance 1.05437E+17 1.15145E+17 1.45359E+17 1.76686E+17 3.7485E+17
Total Revenue $7,887,600,000 $7,887,600,000 $7,887,600,000 $7,887,600,000 $7,887,600,000
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 the first solution shown.  Similarly, the optimal set of taxes was the same for 2% growth through 
7% growth, so this solution is shown only at 7%.  A new set was generated for 8% and 9% 
growth and again for 10%.  No solution was possible at 11% growth.  All of the solutions 
eliminate some of the smaller taxes, including the alcoholic beverage tax and license fee, the 
inheritance and gift tax, and the documentary and stock transfer tax, so these are not shown in 
the table. 
 The solution closest in growth to the 2001 system, rounding up to one with faster growth, 
is the one that generates 9% (as compared to the static 2001 system’s growth of 8.34%).  The 
variance of the 9% solution is less than half that of the actual tax system.  It includes a sales tax 
that raises about 131% of the amount actually raised by the sales tax in 2001.  In addition to the 
taxes that appear in none of the solutions (listed above), the 9% solution also excludes the motor 
vehicle licensing fee and operators license fee, the motor fuels tax, the tobacco tax, the alcoholic 
beverage and hunting/fishing license fees, the public utility license fee, and the severance tax.  
The corporation franchise tax is included at 94% of its 2001 revenue level, while the corporation 
net income tax weighs in at 80% of its 2001 level.  The Hall income tax is included at 89% of its 
actual 2001 level. The insurance premium tax, public utilities tax and the occupation and 
business license fee (this is a Census category, but it includes revenue primarily from the gross 
receipts tax) are listed at revenue levels higher than the actual ones from 2001, with the gross 
receipts tax at near the maximum allowed by the model. 
 As growth is allowed to increase to 10%, the variance still stays below the level of the 
actual 2001 tax system.  The reliance on the sales tax falls to just above its 2001 level; the 
corporation franchise and corporation net income tax revenues increases to the maximum 
allowed by the model, as does the Hall income tax.  The insurance premium tax increases
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 TABLE 6: Current Tax System Plus Flat Tax Optimization Results 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 7.00% 8.00% 9.00% 10.00%
Sales/Gross Receipts $4,704,130,000 $9,408,260,000 8.21% $338,004,830 $2,153,551,437 $1,140,663,047 $4,474,258,014
Corporation 
Franchise $480,242,000 $960,484,000 12.01% $256,544,971 $590,024,332 $960,480,000 $960,480,000
Motor Vehicle 
Licensing Fee $225,933,000 $451,866,000 4.71% $451,870,000 $0 $0 $0
Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 $1,346,930,000 14.23% $0 $445,174,129 $1,155,175,498 $1,346,900,000
Hall Income $198,071,000 $396,142,000 12.46% $0 $0 $396,140,000 $396,140,000
Estimated Flat 
Income Tax $8,906,365,551 $17,812,731,101 6.78% $6,230,824,875 $4,497,214,102 $4,232,000,070 $208,481,175
Insurance Premium 
Tax $296,496,000 $592,992,000 10.12% $312,914,844 $0 $0 $495,980,133
Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 $7,996,000 -3.16% $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $0 $0
Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 $163,342,000 0.22% $19,006,480 $0 $0 $0
Motor Vehicle 
Operators License 
Fee $37,268,000 $74,536,000 4.16% $74,536,000 $0 $0 $0
Occupation and 
Business License Fee $96,821,000 $193,642,000 7.96% $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $3,141,384 $0
Documentary and 
Stock Transfer Tax $117,780,000 $235,560,000 13.03% $0 $0 $0 $5,360,678
Severance Tax $1,131,000 $2,262,000 -0.63% $2,262,000 $0 $0 $0
Minimized Variance 6.22652E+16 1.12466E+17 2.66762E+17 3.83979E+17
Total Revenue $7,887,600,000 $7,887,600,000 $7,887,600,000 $7,887,600,000
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 slightly from its level in the 9% solution, while the public utilities and gross receipts taxes fall 
out of the solution. 
 These solutions suggest that our current tax system could have both higher growth and 
lower variance while still making use of just the taxes already in the system.  The 10% growth 
solution would keep the sales tax near or just above its current levels, while shifting more burden 
to corporate taxes, as well as to financial and investment taxes, including the Hall income tax and 
the insurance premium tax.  This would suggest that the initial impulse of the Sundquist 
administration, to make business taxes more fair and raise them somewhat, would have made a 
more efficient tax system.  This solution gained no traction in the state legislature, however, as 
business groups were generally opposed to it. 
 Table 6 shows the results when the current tax system was combined with a flat income 
tax.  The flat income tax had an average annual growth rate of 6.78%, and a coefficient of 
variation of 16.77%.  So, while slightly more stable than the sales tax, its growth rate was less 
than that of the sales tax.  Consequently, it only showed up in the lower growth, more stable 
solutions.  In the 9% growth solution, the flat income tax was contributing a little less than half 
of its estimated 2001 revenue; it appears at just 2% of its estimated 2001 level in the 10% 
solution.  This tax, while a solid revenue producer, is unlikely to add much to Tennessee’s 
current tax system because it suffers from the same problems, and even more severely so, as the 
sales tax. 
 In the lowest growth solution (7%), the flat income tax largely replaced the sales tax.  As 
growth increased, revenue requirements shifted from the flat income tax to the sales tax.  
Otherwise, the solutions in this scenario resembled those in the current system without the flat 
income tax, though the corporate taxes and the Hall income tax were at their maximum allowed 
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 levels in both the 9% and 10% solutions, rather than just in the 10% one.  In addition, the 
contribution of the gross receipts tax was minimal in the 9% solution. 
 
The Commission’s Proposed System with an Income Tax 
 The Commission proposed a progressive income tax, while lowering the sales tax, 
eliminating the local option sales tax and the Hall income tax, and restructuring and reducing the 
corporate franchise tax.  Because of the proposed elimination of the local option sales tax, the 
Commission’s proposed plans were required to produce additional revenue, enough to make up 
for local option sales tax revenue in 2001.  The taxes that appear in none of the Commission’s 
progressive income tax solutions are the corporate franchise and net income taxes, the alcoholic 
beverage tax, the motor fuels tax, the hunting and fishing license fees, the inheritance and gift 
tax, and the documentary and stock transfer tax.  The solutions for the progressive income tax 
system are shown in Table 7. 
 The lowest growth solution was at 5%, and made use of the grocery sales tax at its 
maximum, and a sales tax on remaining taxable goods at higher than actual 2001 levels.  It 
included the public utilities tax at its maximum, as well as the operator license fee and the gross 
receipts and severance taxes at their maximums.  This solution had a relatively small 
contribution from the progressive income tax, at about 19% of its projected 2001 revenue.  This 
solution did not change until the system was required to meet an 8% growth rate. 
 This 8% growth point made use of every tax not listed above as being in none of the 
solutions.  At maximum allowed levels were the grocery food tax, the motor vehicle licensing 
fee, the public utilities tax, the alcoholic beverage, motor vehicle operators and public utilities 
license fees, the gross receipts tax and the severance tax.  Other taxes that appeared at higher 
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 TABLE 7: Commission Proposal with Progressive Income Tax Optimization Results 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 5.00% 8.00% 9.00% 10.00% 11.00%
Estimated Grocery 
Food $397,498,985 $794,997,970 8.21% $795,000,000 $795,000,000 $795,000,000 $562,151,638 $0
Estimated Non-
Grocery Food and 
Non-Food $4,306,631,015 $8,613,262,030 8.21% $6,821,850,297 $5,577,014,685 $4,111,598,739 $2,815,926,543 $50,578,003
Actual Motor Vehicle 
Licensing Fee $225,933,000 $451,866,000 4.71% $0 $451,870,000 $451,870,000 $0 $0
Commission Income 
Tax Proposal $7,736,918,430 $15,473,836,859 11.02% $1,441,015,703 $2,079,657,948 $3,606,998,564 $5,958,221,819 $9,285,721,997
Actual Insurance 
Premium Tax $296,496,000 $592,992,000 10.12% $0 $39,091,114 $0 $0 $0
Actual Public Utilities 
Tax $3,998,000 $7,996,000 -3.16% $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $0 $0
Actual Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 $163,342,000 0.22% $0 $98,210,253 $79,926,697 $0 $0
Actual Alcoholic 
Beverage License Fee $2,275,000 $4,550,000 4.43% $0 $4,550,000 $0 $0 $0
Operators License 
Fee $37,268,000 $74,536,000 4.16% $74,536,000 $74,536,000 $74,536,000 $0 $0
Actual Public Utility 
License Fee $6,236,000 $12,472,000 5.87% $0 $12,472,000 $12,472,000 $0 $0
Actual Occupation 
and Business License 
Fee $96,821,000 $193,642,000 7.96% $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $0 $0
Actual Severance Tax $1,131,000 $2,262,000 -0.63% $2,262,000 $2,262,000 $2,262,000 $0 $0
Minimized Variance 1.6282E+17 2.14332E+17 3.11063E+17 4.86074E+17 8.35122E+17
Total Revenue $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000
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 than their actual or projected 2001 levels were the general sales tax (158% of 2001) and the 
tobacco tax (120% of 2001).  Taxes that were included in the model at less than their actual or 
projected 2001 levels include the progressive income tax (27%) and the insurance premium tax 
(13%).  The 9% solution changed little from the 8% one, with reliance on the sales tax and 
tobacco tax shifting somewhat to the progressive income tax, while the insurance premium tax 
and the alcoholic beverage license fee fell out of the solution set. 
 This 10% growth point was close in growth rate to the 2001 static model (which had a 
9.5% growth rate), but its variance was significantly smaller.  The 10% growth rate solution 
relied on sales taxes that, as a whole, were about 72% of their 2001 level.  In addition, it required 
a progressive income tax that raised only about three quarters of the revenue that was estimated 
for 2001.  The 11% growth rate solution is almost entirely made up of revenue from the 
progressive income tax, raising about 120% of its estimated 2001 total.  It also included a sales 
tax at around 1% of its 2001 revenue.  The variance of the 11% solution, while higher than the 
lower growth solutions, was still lower than the static model. 
 The sales tax and the progressive income tax are such completely different revenue 
sources that they seem to trade off with one another.  Lower-growth systems rely almost entirely 
on the sales tax; higher growth systems rely almost entirely on the income tax.  The one sort of 
midway point, the 9% growth rate system, put more weight on the sales than the income tax. 
 A different set of solutions entirely was obtained when the flat income tax was 
substituted for the progressive income tax. These results are shown in Table 8.  Taxes excluded 
from any of the solutions were the alcoholic beverage tax and license fee, the motor fuels tax, the 
hunting and fishing license fees, the inheritance and gift tax and the documentary and stock 
transfer tax.  In addition, the lower growth solutions rely heavily on the flat income tax and the 
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 TABLE 8: Commission’s Proposed Income Tax System with Flat Income Tax Optimization Results 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 4.00% 7.00% 8.00% 9.00%
Estimated Grocery Food $397,498,985 $794,997,970 8.21% $795,000,000 $795,000,000 $795,000,000 $795,000,000
Estimated Non-Grocery 
Food and Non-Food $4,306,631,015 $8,613,262,030 8.21% $3,768,730,066 $2,004,712,203 $2,279,283,549 $6,752,808,952
Estimated Corporation 
Franchise - Property Basis 
Removed $392,105,900 $784,211,800 4.57% $0 $211,700,904 $0 $0
Actual Motor Vehicle 
Licensing Fee $225,933,000 $451,866,000 4.71% $363,057,748 $451,870,000 $0 $0
Actual Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 $1,346,930,000 14.23% $0 $0 $929,944,477 $1,333,671,642
Estimated Flat Income Tax $8,906,365,551 $17,812,731,101 6.78% $4,133,283,867 $5,548,329,172 $5,307,375,026 $454,819,406
Actual Insurance Premium 
Tax $296,496,000 $592,992,000 10.12% $0 $0 $21,215,287 $0
Actual Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 $7,996,000 -3.16% $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $0 $0
Actual Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 $163,342,000 0.22% $0 $43,601,844 $0 $0
Actual Motor Vehicle 
Operators License Fee $37,268,000 $74,536,000 4.16% $72,330,319 $74,536,000 $0 $0
Actual Public Utility 
License Fee $6,236,000 $12,472,000 5.87% $0 $2,651,877 $0 $0
Actual Occupation and 
Business License Fee $96,821,000 $193,642,000 7.96% $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $3,481,661 $0
Actual Severance Tax $1,131,000 $2,262,000 -0.63% $2,262,000 $2,262,000 $0 $0
Minimized Variance 7.48515E+16 7.95578E+16 1.59217E+17 2.6282E+17
Total Revenue $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000
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 grocery food tax; the sales tax does not surpass its 2001 revenue level until the 9% growth level.  
This mix of possible taxes has no solution above that 9% growth level, though the solution sets 
are quite stable. 
 The highest growth solution, and the one that exceeds the growth rate of the current tax 
system, relies on just four taxes.  Revenue from the sales tax on grocery food is at a maximum in 
this solution, and revenue from the tax on non-grocery food sales higher than its 2001 level.  The 
corporation net income tax is at the maximum, while the flat income tax contributes just 5% of 
its projected 2001 level.  This solution set has a growth rate just above the state’s current system, 
though its variance is about half that of the current system. 
 The reliance on the sales tax at this growth point is higher than in the current system.  
The progressive income tax solution, on the other hand, allowed for a 10% growth rate with a 
variance just above that of the current system and relied much less on the sales tax.  Thus, even 
though the addition of a flat income tax would be considered by many to be more progressive 
than no change, a tax mix that meets the necessary growth requirements for the state would 
likely still rely more heavily on the sales tax than on the flat income tax.  A progressive-rate 
income tax, on the other hand, allows for stronger growth with a lower reliance on the sales tax 
and a more stable revenue system overall. 
 
The Commission’s Proposed System with a Motor Vehicle Tax and a Real Property Tax 
 This tax system, in the static 2001 model, was inferior to other systems on both measures.  
It had a lower growth rate and a higher variance than our current tax system.  This system fares 
better when the revenues are allowed to vary in the optimization model, though, in order to meet 
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 TABLE 9: Commission Proposal with Motor Vehicle Tax and Real Property Tax Optimization Results 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 3.00% 5.00% 6.00%
Estimated Grocery Food $397,498,985 $794,997,970 8.21% $795,000,000 $795,000,000 $795,000,000
Estimated Non-Grocery Food and Non-
Food $4,306,631,015 $8,613,262,030 8.21% $6,511,089,938 $6,209,551,043 $3,611,146,295
Actual Motor Vehicle Licensing Fee $225,933,000 $451,866,000 4.71% $451,870,000 $451,870,000 $451,870,000
Actual Corporation Net Income $673,465,000 $1,346,930,000 14.23% $0 $0 $0
Estimated Motor Vehicle Tax $525,607,500 $1,051,215,000 1.21% $700,553,445 $824,591,305 $877,926,835
Estimated Real Property Tax $2,389,616,794 $4,779,233,588 9.59% $0 $3,501,652 $3,141,560,870
Actual Insurance Premium Tax $296,496,000 $592,992,000 10.12% $449,702,161 $592,990,000 $0
Actual Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 $7,996,000 -3.16% $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $7,996,000
Actual Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 $163,342,000 0.22% $143,212,453 $163,340,000 $163,340,000
Actual Alcoholic Beverage License Fee $2,275,000 $4,550,000 4.43% $0 $4,550,000 $4,550,000
Actual Motor Vehicle Operators 
License Fee $37,268,000 $74,536,000 4.16% $74,536,000 $74,536,000 $74,536,000
Actual Public Utility License Fee $6,236,000 $12,472,000 5.87% $6,438,004 $12,472,000 $12,472,000
Actual Occupation and Business 
License Fee $96,821,000 $193,642,000 7.96% $193,640,000 $193,640,000 $193,640,000
Actual Documentary and Stock 
Transfer Tax $117,780,000 $235,560,000 13.03% $0 $0 $0
Actual Severance Tax $1,131,000 $2,262,000 -0.63% $2,262,000 $2,262,000 $2,262,000
Minimized Variance 1.22955E+17 1.35306E+17 1.67232E+17
Total Revenue $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000
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 TABLE 9, Continued 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 8.00% 9.00% 10.00%
Estimated Grocery Food $397,498,985 $794,997,970 8.21% $795,000,000 $795,000,000 $703,065,522
Estimated Non-Grocery Food and Non-
Food $4,306,631,015 $8,613,262,030 8.21% $3,639,163,586 $3,142,651,963 $1,736,808,043
Actual Motor Vehicle Licensing Fee $225,933,000 $451,866,000 4.71% $451,870,000 $0 $0
Actual Corporation Net Income $673,465,000 $1,346,930,000 14.23% $0 $352,026,169 $1,346,900,000
Estimated Motor Vehicle Tax $525,607,500 $1,051,215,000 1.21% $653,279,783 $188,681,881 $0
Estimated Real Property Tax $2,389,616,794 $4,779,233,588 9.59% $3,222,601,330 $4,779,200,000 $4,779,200,000
Actual Insurance Premium Tax $296,496,000 $592,992,000 10.12% $265,470,196 $43,100,013 $592,990,000
Actual Public Utilities Tax $3,998,000 $7,996,000 -3.16% $7,996,000 $7,996,000 $0
Actual Tobacco Tax $81,671,000 $163,342,000 0.22% $46,588,329 $0 $0
Actual Alcoholic Beverage License Fee $2,275,000 $4,550,000 4.43% $0 $0 $0
Actual Motor Vehicle Operators 
License Fee $37,268,000 $74,536,000 4.16% $58,428,775 $0 $0
Actual Public Utility License Fee $6,236,000 $12,472,000 5.87% $0 $0 $0
Actual Occupation and Business 
License Fee $96,821,000 $193,642,000 7.96% $193,640,000 $25,381,973 $0
Actual Documentary and Stock 
Transfer Tax $117,780,000 $235,560,000 13.03% $0 $0 $177,336,435
Actual Severance Tax $1,131,000 $2,262,000 -0.63% $2,262,000 $2,262,000 $0
Minimized Variance 1.67355E+17 2.31987E+17 5.03206E+17
Total Revenue $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000 $9,336,300,000
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 the current system’s growth, the statewide property tax rate would have to be twice what was 
recommended.  Like the Commission’s first proposed system, this one must meet the higher 
revenue standard as it proposed to eliminate some local taxes and replace their revenue.  The 
taxes that do not appear in any of the solutions for this system are: the corporation franchise tax, 
the alcoholic beverage tax, the motor fuels tax, and the hunting and fishing license fee and the 
inheritance and gift tax.  The solution set for this tax system appears in Table 9. 
 The lower-growth solutions rely heavily on the sales tax and the motor vehicle tax.  
Revenues fro these taxes diminish as the growth rates increase, but, as mentioned earlier, these 
reductions come at the expense of a state real property tax at the maximum allowed, which is 
twice the recommended level.  Other taxes at or near their maximums in the lower growth 
solutions include the gross receipts tax, the motor vehicle licensing fee, the insurance premium 
tax, the public utilities and tobacco taxes, and the alcoholic beverage, motor vehicle and public 
utilities license fees. 
 The higher growth solutions make use of fewer taxes, with the 10% solution including 
only the grocery tax (near its maximum), the general sales tax (well below its 2001 level), the 
corporation net income tax (at its maximum), the real property tax (at its maximum), the 
insurance premium tax (at its maximum), and the documentary and stock transfer tax (at above 
its 2001 level).  The motor vehicle tax shows very slow growth, just an annual average rate of 
1.21%, so it is strong through the 6% growth solution, is just above its recommended level at 8% 
growth, is a small contributor at 9%, and falls out of the solution set at 10% growth. 
 The variance of this system’s 9% solution, the one closes to while higher than the current 
system’s growth rate, is lower than the 9% growth solutions associated with both the  
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 progressive and flat income taxes in the Commission’s first proposal and the current system with 
the flat income tax.  The variance of this system’s 9% solution, though, is higher than the current 
system’s minimized at the 9% growth rate. 
 
All Major Taxes 
 This tax system was analyzed more as an exercise than as an actual possibility.  It 
includes all of the major taxes used in previous optimizations, but it excludes all of the smaller 
taxes and fees.  The taxes that are included are often somewhat repetitive, as all of the different 
iterations of similar major taxes are included in one optimization.  Required revenue was reduced 
to reflect the removal of the smaller taxes by subtracting the actual 2001 revenue from those 
taxes from the total required.  The results of the analysis are shown in Table 10.  The progressive 
income tax did not appear in any of the solutions.  Otherwise, all of the taxes other than the 
estimated corporate franchise tax (which was the tax levied only on net worth) and the motor 
vehicle licensing fee appear in at least some solutions. 
 The lowest growth solution is at 6%, and it relies almost exclusively on the flat income 
tax.  The Commission’s motor vehicle tax also appears, but at only 29% of its projected 2001 
level.  Other lower-growth solutions rely heavily on the sales tax, motor vehicle tax, and the flat 
income tax.  At the 8% growth rate level, the flat income tax is greatly reduced in favor of more 
reliance on the sales tax.  The 9% growth solution shifts some weight from these taxes to the 
statewide real property tax.  The 10% solution continues this trend toward the property tax, as 
well as introducing the Hall income tax at its maximum.  The 11% solution moves the corporate 
franchise and net income taxes to near their maximums, keeps the Hall income tax at its 
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 TABLE 10: All Major Taxes Optimization Results 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 6.00% 7.00% 8.00%
Actual Sales/Gross 
Receipts $4,704,130,000 $9,408,260,000 8.21% $0 $890,055,852 $2,446,812,675
Estimated Grocery 
Food $397,498,985 $794,997,970 8.21% $0 $0 $795,000,000
Estimated Non-Grocery 
Food and Non-Food $4,306,631,015 $8,613,262,030 8.21% $0 $356,011,870 $2,395,247,251
Actual Corporation 
Franchise $480,242,000 $960,484,000 12.01% $0 $0 $0
Actual Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 $1,346,930,000 14.23% $0 $0 $0
Actual Hall Income $198,071,000 $396,142,000 12.46% $0 $0 $0
Estimated Motor 
Vehicle Tax $525,607,500 $1,051,215,000 1.21% $150,759,035 $70,138,357 $70,524,261
Estimated Flat Income 
Tax $8,906,365,551 $17,812,731,101 6.78% $6,131,040,965 $4,965,593,921 $574,215,813
Estimated Real 
Property Tax $2,389,616,794 $4,779,233,588 9.59% $0 $0 $0
Minimized Variance 1.89118E+16 2.31344E+16 3.93388E+16
Total Revenue $6,281,800,000 $6,281,800,000 $6,281,800,000
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 TABLE 10, Continued 
 
Tax Type 2001 Revenue
Maximum 
Revenue Growth 9.00% 10.00% 11.00%
Actual Sales/Gross 
Receipts $4,704,130,000 $9,408,260,000 8.21% $747,294,703 $1,311,711,656 $0
Estimated Grocery 
Food $397,498,985 $794,997,970 8.21% $0 $0 $0
Estimated Non-Grocery 
Food and Non-Food $4,306,631,015 $8,613,262,030 8.21% $1,947,368,367 $0 $558,016,723
Actual Corporation 
Franchise $480,242,000 $960,484,000 12.01% $0 $426,665,704 $959,787,004
Actual Corporation Net 
Income $673,465,000 $1,346,930,000 14.23% $0 $474,254,751 $1,325,832,309
Actual Hall Income $198,071,000 $396,142,000 12.46% $0 $396,140,000 $396,140,000
Estimated Motor 
Vehicle Tax $525,607,500 $1,051,215,000 1.21% $0 $0 $0
Estimated Flat Income 
Tax $8,906,365,551 $17,812,731,101 6.78% $0 $0 $0
Estimated Real 
Property Tax $2,389,616,794 $4,779,233,588 9.59% $3,587,136,930 $3,673,027,889 $3,042,023,964
Minimized Variance 9.38442E+16 2.05744E+17 3.77856E+17
Total Revenue $6,281,800,000 $6,281,800,000 $6,281,800,000
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 maximum, reduces the importance of the sales tax, and the real property tax. 
 The real surprise in this set of solutions is that the progressive rate income tax never 
comes into play.  When the Commission’s proposal that included that tax was run, the Hall 
income tax was eliminated, and only the corporate franchise tax with the property basis removed 
was included.  The statewide property tax was not available, and the revenue requirement was 
much larger so it could replace the local option sales tax that the Commission recommended 
repealing.  While the progressive income tax produced large revenues and had a high growth 
rate, its rate was points lower than the corporate net income tax, while its coefficient of variation 
was only slightly lower.  The Hall income tax also had a significantly higher growth rate and 
only a slightly higher coefficient of variation.  Meanwhile, the statewide real property tax had 
just over a 1% slower growth rate, but it also had a lower coefficient of variation.  The reduced 
revenue requirement compared to the Commission’s first tax proposal allowed these three taxes 
to combine to replace the progressive income tax at every high growth level. 
 When all of the major taxes are included, the progression through different growth rate 
solutions are otherwise pretty much as expected.  The lower growth solutions pull from the sales 
tax and the flat income tax.  The mid-range solutions pull in the Hall income tax, the statewide 
property tax and the corporate taxes.  The highest growth solutions rely almost exclusively on the 
corporate taxes and the Hall income tax, with a significant revenue addition from the statewide 
real property tax.
 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
 Policy recommendations for the Tennessee tax system are going to call for a change.  
Though revenue has been adequate over the last few years, this has been in large part due to a 
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 general economic recovery and to the cuts in Tenncare.  Such cuts have reached about as far as 
they can go, and continued increases in the cost of basic Medicaid, along with all of the other 
pressures discussed earlier in the paper, will put Tennessee in a budget crunch again.  
Tennessee’s slower growth system will lag just when economic growth is increasing, other states 
are enjoying surpluses, and demand for services is high. 
 There is nothing wrong with a tax system that leans toward stability; such a system offers 
protection in bad economic times, when demands for government aid are often high.  But 
Tennessee’s tax system fails to grow adequately when the economy is booming.  At such times, 
new residents move into the state, putting pressure on existing government services.  While 
safety net services are often in less demand in a strong economy, demand for new infrastructure 
and for increases in basic government services like education, trash collection, codes inspections, 
judicial services, etc. are often on the rise. 
 Many of these kinds of services that have increasing demand in good economic times are 
provided at the local level.  Nonetheless, when Tennessee’s state government suffers during 
these times, it offers less support to local governments just when they most need it.  And those 
services that see increasing demand in a strong economy that are provided by the state, such as 
state park and recreation services and state highway building and maintenance, often suffer as 
well. 
 The state really has three options it could follow to help solve these problems.  The first 
two involve tax reform and are not very politically feasible at the moment.  The third involves 
increased local government autonomy in taxation.  Local governments rely primarily on the 
property tax, which was shown in this analysis to be a relatively stable but slower-growing 
revenue source, much like the primary revenue sources on which the state relies.  Part of the 
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 reason for the slower growth in property tax revenues is the so-called “truth in taxation” 
requirement that makes counties lower their tax rates after every new assessment to make the 
change in property values revenue neutral.  This policy forces counties to take legislative action 
to raise property tax rates if revenues are to simply keep up with inflation.  If local governments 
were allowed to develop some faster-growing revenue sources that were more responsive to 
growth, this could also balance the state system. 
 In looking at tax reform options, two possibilities seem most strongly suggested by the 
data.  The first is business tax reform, coupled with a shift toward taxes on investment, financial 
services and financial transactions.  The 10% growth solution using current taxes shows a 
decrease in the reliance on the sales tax (albeit a small decrease) accompanied by a big increase 
in corporate franchise and net income tax revenue.  In addition, the Hall income tax and the 
insurance premium tax are at or near the maximum amounts allowed. 
 Business taxes currently rely heavily on gross receipts and asset-based taxes.  Though 
partnerships, limited liability companies, and other such business structures have been included 
in the corporate net income tax in recent years, they still avoid much or all of the franchise taxes 
and gross receipts taxes.  The system is not very fair, and it is constructed to tax businesses in an 
economy that is asset and property heavy, such as one that relies on agriculture and 
manufacturing.  As our economy becomes more and more service-oriented, some of the state’s 
bigger business taxes are hitting fewer and fewer businesses. 
 A restructuring of the business tax, not unlike the proposal made by Governor Sundquist 
in 1999, would even out the tax burden and raise more revenue, without necessarily raising taxes 
on those businesses that are already paying the most.  Such a restructuring could also address the 
competitiveness concern of the Tennessee Tax Structure Study Commission (“Commission”), 
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 which worried that the property portion of the franchise tax was a disincentive for businesses to 
come to or stay in Tennessee. 
 Unlike the Commission, I would not recommend eliminating the Hall income tax unless 
it were to be replaced by a general personal income tax.  When the Hall income tax was available 
in the tax mix, all of the high growth solutions made use of it.  As the growth percentage 
increased, so did the Hall income tax.  The highest growth solutions all included the tax at the 
maximum allowed by the model. 
 This tax is one of the few that Tennessee has that grows with income and keeps pace with 
a booming economy.  Its revenue growth, which was volatile in the decade studied, was most 
rapid in the late 1990’s, when the state’s other taxes were lagging.  The Commission’s main 
concern with this tax was that it has a very low exemption of just $1,250 per taxpayer, and, thus, 
it raises revenue from many retirees on fixed incomes.  This could be solved by raising the 
exemption and indexing it to automatically change annually with some inflation indicator, such 
as the Consumer Price Index.  This would protect those on fixed incomes without giving up a 
rare rapid growth tax. 
 This reform recommendation package would also include increases in taxes on financial 
transactions.  These also increase, in both amount and frequency, in good economic times.  
Insurance premiums, real estate transfers and stock transfers are more valuable and more 
frequent among wealthier people.  This would be a progressive increase that only rarely targets 
the majority of people, and the model shows increasing reliance on such taxes as growth 
requirements increase. 
 None of these taxes are new, so there would be no need to create a complex revenue-
gathering system.  Implementing these changes would not violate the simplicity requirement.  To 
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 the extent that different types of businesses are paying vastly different amounts in taxes, a shift 
away from taxing assets and property and toward net income would be a move toward efficiency.  
In addition, reliance on the gross receipts tax could be reduced, and this is widely regarded as an 
inefficient and inequitable tax. 
 Politically, however, this tax reform package is not really feasible.  When Governor 
Sundquist proposed reforming business taxes in 1999, the idea was a complete non-starteer in the 
legislature.  It garnered very little support and was never taken seriously.  Many businesses 
which currently pay only the net income tax are opposed to it, and they hold sway with the 
legislators.  It is possible that a governor who is perceived to be a good businessman and a friend 
of business, such as Governor Bredesen, could move such a reform package through the 
legislature.  But it would be a challenge and a big political risk and would be unlikely to happen 
unless we hit the next state revenue crunch within the next year or two. 
 The second possible tax reform package would be a progressive income tax along the 
lines of the one proposed by the Commission.  When the proposal was adjusted to make use of a 
flat income tax, it was unable to produce the kind of revenue growth required, only reaching 9% 
by dropping the flat income tax almost completely and moving to a much increased sales tax.  
Furthermore, the Commission’s proposal that includes the motor vehicle tax and the property tax 
is even less politically imaginable than the progressive income tax. 
 This proposal includes getting rid of the Hall income tax, part of the proceeds of which 
go to local governments; getting rid of the local option sales tax; encroaching on the main 
revenue source for local governments by adding a state property tax; and encroaching on another 
local revenue source by taxing motor vehicles.  The Commission did propose to replace the local 
option sales tax and Hall income tax revenue for local governments, just as it did when 
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 proposing a progressive income tax, but doing so by making use of the only tax bases local 
governments have is simply not feasible.  Local government officials are likely to raise the 
objection that the state cannot be counted on to keep its revenue-sharing promises in tough times.  
It is certainly true that the revenue that the state shares with local governments was cut during 
two of the more difficult recent fiscal years, when balancing the state budget was a challenge. 
 While local governments would probably also be nervous about losing the local option 
sales tax and accepting a promise from the state to replace it from a state progressive income tax, 
the fact that the new revenue stream does not come from local governments’ only remaining tax 
bases makes it more feasible, though still unlikely, considering the political climate when it 
comes to a state income tax. 
 Again, the flat income tax proposal failed to show enough growth to be given real 
consideration in these policy recommendations.  It grew more slowly than the sales tax, and thus 
would hardly help solve the problems created by the state’s reliance on the sales tax.  In addition, 
a flat income tax would not do nearly as much to address tax equity as would the progressive 
income tax, the equity value of which was well-documented by the Commission. 
 As far as the details of the progressive income tax, my recommendation would be to 
adopt something a little bit different than what was proposed.  As proposed by the Commission, 
this tax raised roughly twice the revenue it needed to raise, and it never figured in any of the 
solutions at anywhere near the estimated 2001 revenue level.  Its top rate of 6% made even some 
of the steadfast supporters of progressive tax reform squeamish, and its exemption and tax 
bracket formulae were overly complex. 
 Instead, I would recommend a system that made use of federal adjusted gross income and 
had brackets with the same endpoints for each type of household.  It might be that a married 
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 household paid 1% in the $20,000 to $30,000 bracket, for instance, while a single person paid 
2% in that bracket, but the bracket would cover the same amounts of income.  I would also 
recommend making 4% the top rate.  As long as investment income is included in state taxable 
income, getting rid of the Hall income tax as part of the package should do no harm. 
 Counting on federal adjusted gross income as a basis for a state income tax can create 
problems, because the state becomes subject to the whims of Congress in the definition of 
adjusted gross income.  Nonetheless, federal income taxes are progressive, exemptions and 
deductions are adjusted over time to reflect inflation, and the simplicity achieved by not forcing 
people to start from scratch when figuring their state income tax burden make this an attractive 
option. 
 When it comes to competitive balance, this recommendation definitely improves the state 
position.  Tennessee’s over-reliance on the sales tax puts the state at a competitive disadvantage 
with its neighbors, as well as with most states across the country.  And while the eroding tax base 
could be solved if streamlined sales tax plans were ever adopted nationally, there is little 
guarantee that this will happen.  The addition of an income tax would not hurt Tennessee in 
comparison with most states, including its neighbors. 
 The efficiency of an income tax versus a higher sales tax is hard to measure, but there is 
an argument to be made for balance.  Why should the labor market have so much less taxation 
than the goods market?  Is the market for goods so much more inelastic?  There is no evidence 
that it is.  By taking some of the burden off of the goods market and placing it on the labor 
market, Tennessee would likely achieve greater efficiency by distorting markets in a more 
balanced fashion. 
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  It must be noted again, however, that the feasibility of such a reform package is very 
much in question.  People have grown tired of the income tax fights.  Tennesseans accepted their 
sales tax increase and expected that to be the end of it.  While it is true that the cuts to Tenncare 
have taken away one of the favorite targets of the anti-tax groups, they will find others.  And 
while Tennesseans might be persuaded to back a tax reform package that left many in the same 
or better financial shape as the current system, that message is not an easy one to get to those 
people amidst the nasty rhetoric of a tax fight.  There is a certain amount of income tax fatigue 
after the 2002 tax wars, and it likely needs a bit more time to subside before any legislators 
would even think of taking up the income tax again. 
 The last policy option to be presented here is one that does not often get discussed when 
looking at state taxes.  It is to leave the state tax system as it is, but to allow local governments to 
make use of some of the higher growth taxes in their own jurisdictions.  In this way, local 
governments would have more revenue in stronger economic times and would be able to provide 
the many local services that have increased demand in those times.  Revenue-sharing 
arrangements with the state could be made more flexible so that, during such times, local 
governments received less revenue from the state, allowing the state to recover from lack of 
growth in state taxes.  In addition, during recessions, the state, which fares fairly well in 
economic slowdowns, could share more revenue with local governments, helping to keep them 
afloat. 
 Such an option would allow a better revenue balance to be achieved without having to 
pass legislation for it at the state level.  It is true that legislation enabling local governments to 
make use of different types of taxes would be required, and that such legislation would likely be 
called a tax increase in a political fight.  But it can also be called local control of local 
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 government, which is far more palatable to the voter.  Furthermore, local governments have 
already been agitating for this kind of flexibility, so there is already a built in support base for it. 
 The kinds of taxes local governments have pursued have mostly involved growth: impact 
fees; adequate facilities taxes; and real estate transfer taxes.  By their very nature, these provide 
more revenue in higher growth times.  In addition, Memphis has pursued a payroll tax.  There are 
constitutional questions about such a tax, but no more so than there are concerning an income 
tax.  And when Memphis put the tax to referendum, it fared poorly, but that is not particularly 
surprising.  The recent proposed sales tax increase in Davidson County also fared poorly.  People 
do not often vote for a tax increase.  But there is no need to subject local taxing authority to 
referendum, and many local governing bodies are prepared to pass new types of taxes. 
 Such a change would also allow cities that wish to provide a higher level of services than 
the state as a whole to do so without having to convince the rest of the state to share their 
philosophy.  The down side of such a system is that some local jurisdictions simply have very 
little base to tax, and new types of taxes will not help them.  Still, this could be considered in 
new, more flexible state revenue sharing plans, which would be necessary to make this option 
one that would actually address the state’s problem.  Equity, efficiency, competitiveness, and 
simplicity questions would have to be answered for the particular taxes proposed by local 
governments.   
 Tennessee will face a revenue crisis again, likely the next time that the rest of the country 
starts to enjoy an economic boom.  While state tax reform is not a politically feasible option at 
the time, it is useful to continue to analyze what direction it should take, as the political winds 
are sure to change sometime in the future.  In the meantime, local fiscal flexibility is a more 
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 politically palatable option that could help to address some of the shortfalls of Tennessee’s 
current revenue system. 
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 APPENDIX 
 
SAS PROGRAM LANGUAGE USED TO RUN OPTIMIZATION 
 
options nonotes nomprint nomlogic nosymbolgen; 
/*        
       DO NOT MODIFY THIS CODE; SCROLL DOWN  
*/ 
%macro loadParametersFromExcel(file,sheet,range1,range2); 
/* Import non-sigma parameters */ 
proc import 
  datafile = &file. 
  out      =  parms replace 
  dbms     =  excel; 
  getnames =  no; 
  range    =  &range1.; 
  sheet    =  &sheet.;  
  run; 
proc sql noprint; 
  select max(F6)   into :R from parms; 
  select count(F1) into :n from parms; 
  quit; 
  %let n = %sysfunc(compbl(&n.)); 
proc sql noprint; 
  select F1 into :name1 - :name&n. from parms; 
  select F3 into :rmin1 - :rmin&n. from parms; 
  select F4 into :rmax1 - :rmax&n. from parms; 
  select F5 into :g1    - :g&n.    from parms; 
  quit; 
data parms; 
  set parms; 
  label f1 = "Tax" 
        f2 = "2001 Revenue"  
        f3 = "Revenue Floor" 
  f4 = "Revenue Ceiling" 
  f5 = "Growth Rate"; 
  rename f1 = TAX; 
  rename f1 = REVENUE_2001; 
  rename f3 = RMIN; 
  rename f4 = RMAX; 
  rename f5 = G; 
  drop f6; 
  run; 
/* Import sigma parameters */ 
proc import 
  datafile =  &file. 
  out      =  sigmas replace 
  dbms     =  excel; 
  getnames =  no; 
  range    =  &range2.; 
  sheet    =  &sheet.;  
  run; 
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 data sigmas; 
  set sigmas; 
  id = _n_; 
  run; 
proc transpose 
  data = sigmas 
  out  = sigmas_vec; 
  by id; 
  run; 
data sigmas; 
  set sigmas; 
  drop id; 
  run; 
data sigmas_zero; 
  set sigmas_vec; 
  if col1 = . then col1 = 0; 
  run; 
proc sql noprint; 
  select col1 into :S separated by ' ' from sigmas_zero; 
  qui
%mend; 
t; 
 
/* Single-shot optimization; inputs are provided as (global) macro variables, 
   outputs (optimal individual revenue shares) are saved in (temporary) data- 
   set GLOBAL_OPTIMUM 
*/ 
%macro initializeOutputDatasets; 
 %let f1 = local_optimum; 
 %let f2 = local_optima;  
 %let f3 = global_optimum;  
 %do i = 1 %to 3;  
     data &&f&i.;   
     %do j = 1 %to &n.;  
         w&j. = .;  
     %end; 
  run; 
 %end; 
%mend; 
%macro initializeWeights; 
 %let ok = 0; 
 %do %while (&ok. = 0); 
      %let sum = ;  
      %do i = 2 %to &n.; 
          %let u    = %sysfunc(uniform(-1)); 
       %let wmin = %sysevalf(&&rmin&i/&R); 
       %let wmax = %sysevalf(&&rmax&i/&R); 
       %let d    = %sysevalf(&wmax - &wmin); 
       %let w&i  = %sysevalf(&wmin + &d*&u); 
    %let sum  = &sum - &&w&i; 
   %end; 
      %let w1   = %sysevalf(1 &sum.); 
      %let wmin = %sysevalf(&rmin1/&R); 
   %let wmax = %sysevalf(&rmax1/&R); 
   %if  %sysevalf(&w1. <= &wmax., boolean)  
       and %sysevalf(&w1. >= &wmin., boolean)  
      %then  %do;  %let ok = 1; 
                parms  
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                    %do i = 2 %to &n.; 
                       w&i. = &&w&i, 
       %end; 
       w1 = &w1.; 
             %end; 
%end; 
%mend; 
%macro setRevenueBounds; 
 bounds 
 %do i = 2 %to &n.; 
     %sysevalf(&&rmin&i./&R.) <= w&i. <= %sysevalf(&&rmax&i./&R.), 
 %end; 
 %sysevalf(&rmin1./&R.) <= w1 <= %sysevalf(&rmax1./&R.); 
%mend; 
%macro setConstraints; 
 lincon w1 
 %do i = 2 %to &n.; 
     + w&i 
 %end; 
 = 1,  
 &g1.*w1 
 %do i = 2 %to &n.; 
     %let sign = ; %if %sysevalf(&&g&i>0, boolean) > 0 %then %let sign = + ; 
     &sign. &&g&i.*w&i 
 %end; 
 >= &
%mend  
lambda.; 
;
%macro computeObjFunction; 
 %let f = f = 0; 
 %do i = 1 %t n.; o &
     %do j = 1 %to &i.; 
      %let weight = ; 
         %if %sysevalf(&i = &j, boolean) %then %let weight = 0.5*;  
      %let k  = %sysevalf(&n.*&i. + &j. - &n.); 
   %let sk = %scan(&S.,&k.,' '); 
   %let sign = ; %if %sysevalf(&&sk>0, boolean) > 0 %then %let sign 
= + ; 
   %let f = &f. &sign. &weight.&sk*w&i.*w&j.; 
     %end; 
 %end; 
 &f. 
%mend; 
 
%macro runOneOptimization; 
 %initializeOutputDatasets;  
 %let meth1 = QUANEW; 
 %let meth2 = TRUREG; 
 %let meth3 = NEWRAP; 
 %let meth4 = CONGRA; 
 %do init_cond = 1 %to 100; 
     %do meth  = 1 %to 1; 
         /* Compute a local optimum */ 
         %put "Trying starting-value combination &init_cond. for scenario 
&scenario.. &par. = &&&par."; 
   /* %put "Optimization method: &&meth&meth"; */ 
         proc nlp noprint  
           /* tech   = &&meth&meth. */ 
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      outest = local_optimum; 
           min f; 
        %initializeWeights; 
           %setRevenueBounds; 
        %setConstraints; 
        %computeObjFunction; 
           run; 
         data local_optima; 
           set local_optima local_optimum; 
        if _TYPE_ in ('PARMS') then output; 
        run; 
    %end; 
 %end; 
 proc sql; 
   create table global_optimum 
   as select * 
   from local_optima  
   where _rhs_ = select max(_rhs_) from local_optima; 
   quit;  
%mend; 
 
%macro runManyOptimizations(par,file); 
 proc sql noprint; 
   select count(x) into :m from varying_parameter; 
   quit; 
 %let m = %sysfunc(compbl(&m.)); 
 proc sql noprint; 
   select x into :&par.1 - :&par.&m. from varying_parameter; 
   quit; 
 data optimal_w; set _null_; run; 
 %do l = 1 %to &m.; 
     %let &par. = &&&par&l; 
     %runOneOptimization; 
  data optimal_w; 
       set optimal_w global_optimum; 
       run; 
 %end;  
 data optimal_w;  
   set optimal_w;  
   if n (of _numeric_) < 2 then delete;  
   array x _numeric_; do over x; if x < .0000001 then x = 0; end; 
   run; 
 data optimal_w; 
   merge varying_parameter optimal_w; 
   label x = "Varying parameter: &par."; 
   rename x = &par.; 
   run; 
 data optimal_r1; 
    set optimal_w; 
 array x w1 - w&n.; 
 array y r1 - r&n.; 
    do i = 1 to &n.; 
    y(i) = x(i)*&R.;  
    end; 
 %do i = 1 %to &n.; 
    label r&i = "&&name&i: optimal revenue";  
    r&i = round(r&i); 
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     %end; 
 run; 
 data optimal_r1; 
   set optimal_r1; 
   fmin = &R.*sqrt(_rhs_); 
   label fmin = "Minimized std. deviation of TR"; 
   drop i w: _:; 
   run; 
 proc transpose 
   data = optimal_r1 
   out  = temp; 
   /*var r:; */ 
   by &par.; 
   run; 
 data temp2; 
   set temp; 
   x = substr(_name_,2,2); 
   y = input(x,2.); 
   run; 
 data temp2; 
   set temp2; 
   drop _name_ _label_ x; 
   run; 
 proc sort 
   data = temp2; 
   by y; 
   run; 
 proc transpose 
   data = temp2 
   out  = temp3; 
   by y; 
   var col1; 
   run; 
 data temp4; 
   set temp3; 
   %do i = 1 %to &n.; 
       rename col&i. = r&i.;  
       label  col&i. = "Optimal revenue (&par. = &&&par&i)"; 
   %end; 
   drop y _name_; 
   run; 
 data goal optimal_r2; 
   set temp4; 
   if _n_ = 1 then output goal; else output optimal_r2; 
   run; 
 data optimal_r2; 
   merge parms optimal_r2; 
   run; 
 proc sql noprint; 
   %do i = 1 %to &m.;  
       select r&i into :F&i. from goal; 
       select sum(r&i) into :Q&i. from optimal_r2; 
   %end; 
   %let RR = &R.; 
   %let QQ = &Q1.; 
   %let FF = &F1.; 
   %do i = 2 %to &m.;  
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        %let RR = &RR, &R; 
       %let QQ = &QQ, &&Q&i; 
    %let FF = &FF, &&F&i; 
   %end;  
   insert into optimal_r2 values('Required  total revenue',.,.,.,.,&RR.); 
   insert into optimal_r2 values('Generated total revenue',.,.,.,.,&QQ.); 
   insert into optimal_r2 values('Minimized std. deviation of 
TR',.,.,.,.,&FF.); 
   quit; 
 proc export 
   data    = optimal_r2 
   outfile = &file. 
   dbms    = EXCEL replace; 
   sheet   = "Column per &par."; 
   run; 
 proc export 
   data    = optimal_r1 
   outfile = &file. 
   dbms    = EXCEL replace; 
   sheet   = "Row per &par."; 
   ru
%mend; 
n; 
 
 
%macro varList(prefix,m); 
  %let list = ; 
  %do i = 1 %to &m.;  
      %let list = &list. &prefix.&i; 
  %end; 
  &li
%mend; 
st. 
%global n R S scenario 
         %varList(R,100     %varList(lambd 100) )  a,
         %varList(name,100)   %varList(rmin,100)   
         %varList(rmax,100)   %varList(g,100)   
         %varList(w,100); 
 
/*   
    MODIFY THIS CODE 
*/ 
%let path = C:\Documents and Settings\Dimitri Shvorob\My Documents\Rose\; 
%let
data varying_parameter; 
 file = Data_061206_DS.XLS; 
  input x @@; 
  cards;  
  0  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 
  run; 
 
%let scenario = Curr Taxes; 
%loadParametersFromExcel("&path.&file.","&scenario.","A3:F20","B24:S41"); 
%runManyOptimizations(lambda,"&path.&scenario."); 
 
%let scenario = Comm Prop 1; 
%loadParametersFromExcel("&path.&file.","&scenario.","A3:F21","B25:T43"); 
%runManyOptimizations(lambda,"&path.&scenario."); 
 
%let scenario = Comm Prop 2; 
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 %loadParametersFromExcel("&path.&file.","&scenario.","A3:F22","B26:U45"); 
%runManyOptimizations(lambda,"&path.&scenario."); 
 
%let scenario = Curr Plus Flat; 
%loadParametersFromExcel("&path.&file.","&scenario.","A3:F21","B25:T43"); 
%runManyOptimizations(lambda,"&path.&scenario."); 
 
%let scenario = Comm Prop 1 & Flat; 
%loadParametersFromExcel("&path.&file.","&scenario.","A3:F21","B25:T43"); 
%runManyOptimizations(lambda,"&path.&scenario."); 
 
%let scenario = All; 
%loadParametersFromExcel("&path.&file.","&scenario.","A3:F14","B18:M29"); 
%runManyOptimizations(lambda,"&path.&scenario."); 
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